Alternative Approaches to Defining Evangelicals

In order to engage in this conversation, it is necessary that discussants be clear about whom or to what they are referring when they employ the words “evangelicalism” and “evangelicals.”  Of course, the starting premise of this conversation is that evangelicalism as a religious expression has been, and continues to be, evident within American history and that evangelicals do exist.  Still, there are those who may choose to dispute even this basic contention.  For example, one scholar (Hart 2004, 16-17) has gone so far as to contend that any attempt to study evangelical Christians is simply doomed to failure in that the religious category “evangelicals” is basically a figment of one’s imagination—being “a constructed ideal without any real substance” that “needs to be relinquished as a religious identity because it does not exist.”   This conversation, of course, takes the presence of evangelicalism and evangelicals within American society as empirical realities and not some “constructed ideal without…substance.”

Nevertheless, both journalists and scholars have frequently employed, either knowingly or unwittingly, different conceptual understandings, varying definitional approaches, and divergent measurement strategies when trying to analyze the subject matter. Because it is not self-evident just to what one is referring when the terms “evangelical” or “evangelicalism” are used, it is easy for those engaging in conversations related to these topics to employ the same label to capture different phenomena.  These issues are no small matter, as one’s particular definition and conceptual understanding shape the findings and conclusions one draws.

As discussed in more detail within my most recent book, American Evangelicals Today, there are at least three distinct, yet interrelated, issues that confront the analyst when seeking to define just who should be classified as evangelicals (Smidt 2013, Chapter 2). The first relates to whether religion (and thereby evangelicalism) constitutes primarily a cognitive or a social phenomenon. Clearly, beliefs and behavior are interrelated, but they are analytically distinct.  On the one hand, beliefs are central to any understanding of religion and religious life. On the other hand, religion is frequently viewed by other scholars as reflecting a social phenomenon, with members exhibiting certain patterns of social interaction and membership within distinctive social networks. To emphasize religious beliefs as the source of unity among evangelicals is to suggest a some kind of cognitive uniformity characterizes evangelicals, whereas for social groups, it is not the uniformity of holding certain beliefs that define the group, but rather patterns of affiliation and interaction that, in turn, are associated with a greater tendency (but not uniformity) to think or act in particular ways.  

The second issue, somewhat intertwined with the first, relates to whether evangelicals constitute simply some categorical designation of individuals whose “unity” as a collectivity is a function of the stipulated criteria employed by the analyst—or whether evangelicals should be viewed instead as a social group that exhibits a certain level of social cohesion. For example, Bebbington (1989) is frequently cited for his definition of evangelicals in which he stipulates four major qualities that define evangelicals: biblicism, crucicentrism, conversionism, and activism.  However, such a listing (1) suggests that all evangelicals hold these four qualities, (2) leaves unanswered whether those who may subscribe to most, but not all, of the four specified beliefs are nevertheless considered to be evangelicals, and (3) implies that evangelicals represent little more than a categorical group unified simply by the stipulated criteria employed.

Others, for example, have defined evangelicals in terms of their stance on the authority of scripture—suggesting that all evangelicals subscribe to the notion of biblical inerrancy, thereby excluding those who subscribe to the older, and broader, notion of biblical infallibility.  The point here is simply that, by demanding uniformity in religious beliefs for any definition of who evangelicals are, one suggest that evangelicals constitute simply a categorical, and not a social, group.    

Social groups are different from categorical groups in that social groups are linked together in a web-like fashion by interconnecting patterns of social interaction resulting in a certain level of social cohesion, despite the fact that all members of a social group do not hold identical beliefs. Categorical and social groups are different in nature—with the former exhibiting a certain level of unity based on the criteria proscribed by some analyst, while the other exhibits a certain level of social cohesion based, in part, on social relationships among members of the group.  Again, the analyst is forced to decide on the nature of the unity that defines those who fall within the umbrella of the label “evangelical”—whether is something more arbitrarily stipulated by the analyst or something more organic in nature. 

Let’s assume for the time being that evangelicals comprise something more than a categorical group and represent a social group of some type. Of course, holding that evangelicals constitute a social group does not specify the particular kind of social group it comprises. Thus, the third issue relates to whether evangelicals are better conceptualized to be individuals tied to a particular religious movement or individuals affiliated with a particular religious tradition.    

Should evangelicals be viewed basically as “members” of a particular religious movement? Social movements seek change, and religious movements seek change within religious life and institutions. Some religious movements operate within a particular religious tradition (e.g., the movement to return to the Latin mass within the Catholic Church), while other movements often cross denominational boundaries and occasionally even transcend religious traditions (e.g., the charismatic movement is found within both Protestantism and Catholicism). In seeking religious change, organizations may be created within the movement to accomplish certain ends, and over time, facets of the religious movement and its associated organizations may become institutionalized and perhaps even transformed into a religious tradition itself. After all, Protestantism today may be considered a religious tradition, though initially it represented simply an effort by various reformers who sought religious change within the Catholic Church. 

Some analysts view evangelicalism as a religious movement that transcends most, if not all, Protestant denominations and which possesses certain tendencies that may even find expression within the Catholic Church as well.  It is fairly commonplace to see evangelicals as being tied to a religious movement—this is particularly true among religious historians and theologians.

On the other hand, many social scientists treat evangelical Protestants as a religious tradition by virtue of being affiliated with a distinct set of religious denominations and congregations that are interrelated in some historical and organizational fashion and whose “members” exhibit relatively similar beliefs and behaviors (e.g. Steensland et al, 2000). Religious traditions have somewhat different tendencies than religious movements: movements seek change, while traditions try to protect and retain the established core principles and values that are historically part of the tradition. Typically, those who adopt the religious tradition approach view evangelical Protestantism as one of the major religious traditions present within American religious life today.

In the end, however, evangelicals can be viewed socially as those linked to a particular religious movement or as those who are affiliated with a particular religious tradition. However, while these two approaches are intertwined, each conceptualization emphasizes different tendencies and captures different segments of American society. If viewed in terms of those associated with a religious tradition, then evangelicals are found in certain denominations but not in others, whereas if viewed as those associated with a religious movement, then evangelicals are present within most, if not all, Protestant denominations and perhaps even within the Catholic Church itself.

While any of these three analytical approaches may be adopted in defining what evangelicalism is and who evangelicals (i.e., members of some categorical group, “members” of a religious movement, or “members” of a religious tradition), the analyst who seeks to be consistent in his or her analysis and discussion is forced to adopt one approach as opposed to the other two.

References

Bebbington, David W.  1989.  Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from 1730s to the 1980s. London: Unwin Hyman.

Hart, D.G. 2004. Deconstructing Evangelicalism: Conservative Protestantism in the Age of Billy Graham. Grand Rapids. Mich.: Baker Book House.

Smidt, Corwin E. 2013. American Evangelicals Today.  Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefiled.

Steensland, Brian, Jerry Park, Mark Regnerus, W. Bradley Wilcox, and Robert Woodberry. 2000 “The Measure of American Religion: Toward Improving the State of Art.” Social Forces 79: 291-318.