TOPIC # 7: Same-Sex Marriage
Please consider the following potential leading questions
#1: What do you believe to be the meaning of “marriage,” and how does that meaning relate to what politicians say about “family values” and your own understanding of “family values?”
#2: Given that there is significant disagreement in our pluralistic society, both within and outside of religious bodies, as to the meaning of “marriage,” what role, if any, should government play in setting public policies that embrace one particular meaning?
#3: Since same sex marriage is now legal in some states and is likely to become legal in others, what steps can and should be taken to protect the freedom of persons and organizations with religious objections to same sex relationships from having to take part in, support, or in some ways treat same sex couples in the same manner as traditional, heterosexual couples?
#4: Since having a variety of state laws on the subject of same sex marriage leads to legal confusions and conundrums, should there be a federal law or Constitutional amendment that establishes one policy on same sex marriage (either outlawing or providing for it) for the entire nation?
#5: It is argued that to allow civil unions for all couples, but to limit “marriage” to heterosexual couples, is a form of unjust discrimination. What is your assessment of this argument?
#6: It has been argued that government should, for the most part, get out of the business of sanctioning marriage vows for any couples, thereby enabling any couple, heterosexual or same-sex, to identify that Church or civic authority (e.g., a Justice of the Peace) whose beliefs and practices allow for their marriage to administer marriage vows. What is your assessment of this argument?
Question #1 –
Marriage is the monogamous, exclusive, and permanent union of husband and wife. Marriage is an intrinsic good and is not a mere means to another good. Saying this, marriage is consummated in full physical union, and because this physical union is of the kind that can produce children, marriage, in a sense, anticipates the family. The family consists of a union of husband and wife and children. Other family forms, while often profoundly admirable and deserving of respect, are deviations from the structure of the family as just described.
Politicians use the language of “family values” most fruitfully when they contend that government law and policy should reflect the basic truths underlying the description of marriage and the family above. Simply put, children are best served when raised by their married mother and father, and promoting this outcome is central to marriage law.
Question #1 –
Marriage is the monogamous, exclusive, and permanent union of husband and wife. Marriage is an intrinsic good and is not a mere means to another good. Saying this, marriage is consummated in full physical union, and because this physical union is of the kind that can produce children, marriage, in a sense, anticipates the family. The family consists of a union of husband and wife and children. Other family forms, while often profoundly admirable and deserving of respect, are deviations from the structure of the family as just described.
Politicians use the language of “family values” most fruitfully when they contend that government law and policy should reflect the basic truths underlying the description of marriage and the family above. Simply put, children are best served when raised by their married mother and father, and promoting this outcome is central to marriage law.
Question #1 –
Marriage is the monogamous, exclusive, and permanent union of husband and wife. Marriage is an intrinsic good and is not a mere means to another good. Saying this, marriage is consummated in full physical union, and because this physical union is of the kind that can produce children, marriage, in a sense, anticipates the family. The family consists of a union of husband and wife and children. Other family forms, while often profoundly admirable and deserving of respect, are deviations from the structure of the family as just described.
Politicians use the language of “family values” most fruitfully when they contend that government law and policy should reflect the basic truths underlying the description of marriage and the family above. Simply put, children are best served when raised by their married mother and father, and promoting this outcome is central to marriage law.
Question #2 –
Many disagreements in a pluralistic society should be left to private citizens, associations, and institutions to continuously debate without any governmental intervention or adjudication. But the fact of a pluralistic society does not, by itself, determine the array of goods that are properly the domain of government law and policy. For example, American society is very divided in its views on the legality of certain drugs but this is not a sufficient basis to justify removing all legal obstacles to acquiring them. I think marriage advocates have legitimate reasons for claiming that government law and policy should recognize the union of husband and wife and not other interpersonal, adult relationships. To discern whether and in what ways government should set public policies that embrace one particular meaning of marriage, we should ask whether the union of husband and wife involves a genuine public good, which is absent in same-sex unions. Regardless of how pluralistic our society is, the nature of government requires that decisions be made on some things.
Question #2 –
Many disagreements in a pluralistic society should be left to private citizens, associations, and institutions to continuously debate without any governmental intervention or adjudication. But the fact of a pluralistic society does not, by itself, determine the array of goods that are properly the domain of government law and policy. For example, American society is very divided in its views on the legality of certain drugs but this is not a sufficient basis to justify removing all legal obstacles to acquiring them. I think marriage advocates have legitimate reasons for claiming that government law and policy should recognize the union of husband and wife and not other interpersonal, adult relationships. To discern whether and in what ways government should set public policies that embrace one particular meaning of marriage, we should ask whether the union of husband and wife involves a genuine public good, which is absent in same-sex unions. Regardless of how pluralistic our society is, the nature of government requires that decisions be made on some things.
Question #2 –
Many disagreements in a pluralistic society should be left to private citizens, associations, and institutions to continuously debate without any governmental intervention or adjudication. But the fact of a pluralistic society does not, by itself, determine the array of goods that are properly the domain of government law and policy. For example, American society is very divided in its views on the legality of certain drugs but this is not a sufficient basis to justify removing all legal obstacles to acquiring them. I think marriage advocates have legitimate reasons for claiming that government law and policy should recognize the union of husband and wife and not other interpersonal, adult relationships. To discern whether and in what ways government should set public policies that embrace one particular meaning of marriage, we should ask whether the union of husband and wife involves a genuine public good, which is absent in same-sex unions. Regardless of how pluralistic our society is, the nature of government requires that decisions be made on some things.
Same-sex unions should be recognized as marriages only in those states with such laws in place, and these state laws should not be used as a way to impose same-sex marriage on other states or the Federal Government. Furthermore, firm protections should be in place for institutions and organizations that do not accept same-sex unions as a valid moral option. Both individual consciences and institutional convictions must be protected.
Same-sex unions should be recognized as marriages only in those states with such laws in place, and these state laws should not be used as a way to impose same-sex marriage on other states or the Federal Government. Furthermore, firm protections should be in place for institutions and organizations that do not accept same-sex unions as a valid moral option. Both individual consciences and institutional convictions must be protected.
Same-sex unions should be recognized as marriages only in those states with such laws in place, and these state laws should not be used as a way to impose same-sex marriage on other states or the Federal Government. Furthermore, firm protections should be in place for institutions and organizations that do not accept same-sex unions as a valid moral option. Both individual consciences and institutional convictions must be protected.
Question #4 –
Since there is so much division on this issue, I think that neither a federal law (referring here to one that impacts more than just interlinkages with the Federal Government, so not DOMA) nor a Constitutional amendment is the best path forward. If the difficult but worthwhile case is to be made that legalizing same-sex marriage is not the civil rights issue of our time, it must be done state-by-state. To approach such a divisive issue totally from the top down would have no guarantee of longevity and would invite the same approach by the opposing side. Only a sustained, state-by-state, region-by-region effort can be successful in the long-term. And it must explain why marriage matters, why family is important, and why neither can be legally or culturally redefined based on the latest social sensibilities. We shouldn’t be naïve to the fact that proponents of same-sex marriage desire a top-down approach and reveal as much when they argue vehemently that state and federal laws prohibiting same-sex marriage violate the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. Framing the argument in this way suggests that they believe the only proper and just response to this issue is a Supreme Court ruling that declares such laws unconstitutional. So while I argue for a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction effort, I do not believe same-sex marriage advocates can, in principle, agree to pursue this approach from their perspective.
Question #4 –
Since there is so much division on this issue, I think that neither a federal law (referring here to one that impacts more than just interlinkages with the Federal Government, so not DOMA) nor a Constitutional amendment is the best path forward. If the difficult but worthwhile case is to be made that legalizing same-sex marriage is not the civil rights issue of our time, it must be done state-by-state. To approach such a divisive issue totally from the top down would have no guarantee of longevity and would invite the same approach by the opposing side. Only a sustained, state-by-state, region-by-region effort can be successful in the long-term. And it must explain why marriage matters, why family is important, and why neither can be legally or culturally redefined based on the latest social sensibilities. We shouldn’t be naïve to the fact that proponents of same-sex marriage desire a top-down approach and reveal as much when they argue vehemently that state and federal laws prohibiting same-sex marriage violate the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. Framing the argument in this way suggests that they believe the only proper and just response to this issue is a Supreme Court ruling that declares such laws unconstitutional. So while I argue for a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction effort, I do not believe same-sex marriage advocates can, in principle, agree to pursue this approach from their perspective.
Question #4 –
Since there is so much division on this issue, I think that neither a federal law (referring here to one that impacts more than just interlinkages with the Federal Government, so not DOMA) nor a Constitutional amendment is the best path forward. If the difficult but worthwhile case is to be made that legalizing same-sex marriage is not the civil rights issue of our time, it must be done state-by-state. To approach such a divisive issue totally from the top down would have no guarantee of longevity and would invite the same approach by the opposing side. Only a sustained, state-by-state, region-by-region effort can be successful in the long-term. And it must explain why marriage matters, why family is important, and why neither can be legally or culturally redefined based on the latest social sensibilities. We shouldn’t be naïve to the fact that proponents of same-sex marriage desire a top-down approach and reveal as much when they argue vehemently that state and federal laws prohibiting same-sex marriage violate the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. Framing the argument in this way suggests that they believe the only proper and just response to this issue is a Supreme Court ruling that declares such laws unconstitutional. So while I argue for a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction effort, I do not believe same-sex marriage advocates can, in principle, agree to pursue this approach from their perspective.
Allowing same-sex couples access to civil unions while preventing them access to marriage is certainly a form of discrimination but it is not unjust discrimination. There is nothing necessarily wrong with treating different things differently. The question is, do those differences merit unequal treatment. Whether certain non-marital legal rights and benefits should be available to same-sex couples and other persons involved in sustained interpersonal relationships is a worthy debate and one in which Christians should be willing to thoughtfully engage.
Allowing same-sex couples access to civil unions while preventing them access to marriage is certainly a form of discrimination but it is not unjust discrimination. There is nothing necessarily wrong with treating different things differently. The question is, do those differences merit unequal treatment. Whether certain non-marital legal rights and benefits should be available to same-sex couples and other persons involved in sustained interpersonal relationships is a worthy debate and one in which Christians should be willing to thoughtfully engage.
Allowing same-sex couples access to civil unions while preventing them access to marriage is certainly a form of discrimination but it is not unjust discrimination. There is nothing necessarily wrong with treating different things differently. The question is, do those differences merit unequal treatment. Whether certain non-marital legal rights and benefits should be available to same-sex couples and other persons involved in sustained interpersonal relationships is a worthy debate and one in which Christians should be willing to thoughtfully engage.
Question 6 –
Same-sex couples, marriage couples, and persons involved in other types of interpersonal arrangements already have the right to identify civic authorities and institutions that will provide them public witness and validation. The fact that the government recognizes a particular interpersonal relationship and gives it special legal status does not take that right away. For the government to get involved in marriage in the first place is an entanglement that should not be taken lightly, but there are reasons rooted in the structure of human social reality that make such a limited entanglement legitimate. To expand marriage law, however, to same-sex couples based on the single overriding principle that individuals should be free to choose whomever they want to marry, would be to eliminate any sense of why marriage law exists in the first place and to remove any limiting principle as to what kinds of interpersonal arrangements marriage law should recognize even beyond same-sex unions (e.g., polygamy). If marriage law should define marriage based on the preferences and choices of individual persons alone, as same-sex marriage proponents advocate, then there is no way to limit marriage to two people, and same-sex marriage proponents should be honest about this.
The problem with this whole debate is implied in question #6. We need to have a debate about the nature and purpose of marriage law in the first place. It appears likely that this debate will continue to unfold without most politicians and advocates on either side ever really addressing this fundamental issue. Ultimately, people who support defining marriage as the union of husband and wife need to articulate the fact that marriage is a pre-political institution that one can enter into within the parameters of that institution and that the government does not create, but rather, recognizes that pre-political institution because of the genuine public goods that it provides. Government cannot redefine an institution it did not create nor can autonomous persons. The point of emphasis beyond the public goods that marriage provides should be to address the civil rights question as follows: all persons have equal access to marriage but some, including same-sex couples, don’t want a marriage, they want something else.
Question 6 –
Same-sex couples, marriage couples, and persons involved in other types of interpersonal arrangements already have the right to identify civic authorities and institutions that will provide them public witness and validation. The fact that the government recognizes a particular interpersonal relationship and gives it special legal status does not take that right away. For the government to get involved in marriage in the first place is an entanglement that should not be taken lightly, but there are reasons rooted in the structure of human social reality that make such a limited entanglement legitimate. To expand marriage law, however, to same-sex couples based on the single overriding principle that individuals should be free to choose whomever they want to marry, would be to eliminate any sense of why marriage law exists in the first place and to remove any limiting principle as to what kinds of interpersonal arrangements marriage law should recognize even beyond same-sex unions (e.g., polygamy). If marriage law should define marriage based on the preferences and choices of individual persons alone, as same-sex marriage proponents advocate, then there is no way to limit marriage to two people, and same-sex marriage proponents should be honest about this.
The problem with this whole debate is implied in question #6. We need to have a debate about the nature and purpose of marriage law in the first place. It appears likely that this debate will continue to unfold without most politicians and advocates on either side ever really addressing this fundamental issue. Ultimately, people who support defining marriage as the union of husband and wife need to articulate the fact that marriage is a pre-political institution that one can enter into within the parameters of that institution and that the government does not create, but rather, recognizes that pre-political institution because of the genuine public goods that it provides. Government cannot redefine an institution it did not create nor can autonomous persons. The point of emphasis beyond the public goods that marriage provides should be to address the civil rights question as follows: all persons have equal access to marriage but some, including same-sex couples, don’t want a marriage, they want something else.
Question 6 –
Same-sex couples, marriage couples, and persons involved in other types of interpersonal arrangements already have the right to identify civic authorities and institutions that will provide them public witness and validation. The fact that the government recognizes a particular interpersonal relationship and gives it special legal status does not take that right away. For the government to get involved in marriage in the first place is an entanglement that should not be taken lightly, but there are reasons rooted in the structure of human social reality that make such a limited entanglement legitimate. To expand marriage law, however, to same-sex couples based on the single overriding principle that individuals should be free to choose whomever they want to marry, would be to eliminate any sense of why marriage law exists in the first place and to remove any limiting principle as to what kinds of interpersonal arrangements marriage law should recognize even beyond same-sex unions (e.g., polygamy). If marriage law should define marriage based on the preferences and choices of individual persons alone, as same-sex marriage proponents advocate, then there is no way to limit marriage to two people, and same-sex marriage proponents should be honest about this.
The problem with this whole debate is implied in question #6. We need to have a debate about the nature and purpose of marriage law in the first place. It appears likely that this debate will continue to unfold without most politicians and advocates on either side ever really addressing this fundamental issue. Ultimately, people who support defining marriage as the union of husband and wife need to articulate the fact that marriage is a pre-political institution that one can enter into within the parameters of that institution and that the government does not create, but rather, recognizes that pre-political institution because of the genuine public goods that it provides. Government cannot redefine an institution it did not create nor can autonomous persons. The point of emphasis beyond the public goods that marriage provides should be to address the civil rights question as follows: all persons have equal access to marriage but some, including same-sex couples, don’t want a marriage, they want something else.
Nathan: your argument, which is mostly sound, revolves around this assertion, which can, I believe, be challenged:
"we should ask whether the union of husband and wife involves a genuine public good, which is absent in same-sex unions."
Those who advocate for same sex unions would argue that there is a "genuine public good" that comes from same sex unions. Those who advocate for adoption over abortion could say that this widens the adoption pool. They would also say that a monogamous relationship given credence by a public declaration of fidelity, is far better than any alternatives for those who have same sex orientation. It is better for those who are gay. It is better for society.
These assertions could, of course, be challenged. But they do have enough validity to challenge your basic assumption.
Nathan: your argument, which is mostly sound, revolves around this assertion, which can, I believe, be challenged:
"we should ask whether the union of husband and wife involves a genuine public good, which is absent in same-sex unions."
Those who advocate for same sex unions would argue that there is a "genuine public good" that comes from same sex unions. Those who advocate for adoption over abortion could say that this widens the adoption pool. They would also say that a monogamous relationship given credence by a public declaration of fidelity, is far better than any alternatives for those who have same sex orientation. It is better for those who are gay. It is better for society.
These assertions could, of course, be challenged. But they do have enough validity to challenge your basic assumption.
Nathan: your argument, which is mostly sound, revolves around this assertion, which can, I believe, be challenged:
"we should ask whether the union of husband and wife involves a genuine public good, which is absent in same-sex unions."
Those who advocate for same sex unions would argue that there is a "genuine public good" that comes from same sex unions. Those who advocate for adoption over abortion could say that this widens the adoption pool. They would also say that a monogamous relationship given credence by a public declaration of fidelity, is far better than any alternatives for those who have same sex orientation. It is better for those who are gay. It is better for society.
These assertions could, of course, be challenged. But they do have enough validity to challenge your basic assumption.
John,
I appreciate your challenging comments. For clarification, I assume that your reference to “advocates of same sex unions” specifically means advocates of same-sex marriage, i.e., those who support the full application of marriage law to same-sex couples who seek to be “married.” The rest of my comments assume this to be the case.
First, you mention the potential for same-sex unions to contribute to a “genuine public good” by increasing the size of the adoption pool (surely a public good for anti-abortion folks, you suggest). I am opposed to abortion but would assert that gays and lesbians are such a small portion of the population, and those in stable, permanent relationships still a smaller portion, that encouraging evangelical and Catholic married couples to be more engaged in adoption would be exceedingly more fruitful for Christians who really seek to increase the adoption pool for children needing a home. In addition, in its May 2012 issue Christianity Today featured a discussion on how Christian organizations should approach laws mandating the placement of children with gay parents (http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2012/may/child-placement-programs.html?start=2). I’m still thinking through this broader issue and haven’t given it sufficient thought yet to conclude whether I would, in the first place, be willing to characterize an increase in the number same-sex couples willing to adopt as a “genuine public good.”
Second, I do believe that monogamy, permanence, and exclusivity among gay and lesbian couples is a genuine good but so are all sorts of sustained, loving friendships. This does not necessarily warrant their legal recognition and support as a matter of public justice. I think redefining marriage as a loving relationship between two adults rather than the union of husband and wife will lead to complex, deleterious legal entanglements, problematic cultural shifts, and further erosion of the meaning of conjugal marriage and its inherent connection to children. Basically, the union of husband and wife is distinct from other types of meaningful friendships (among which I would count many same-sex couples) because the political community (i.e., citizens in relation to government) has a genuine public interest in the sexual behavior of heterosexuals before children are conceived because of the possibility of children, and after children are conceived, because children deserve and are best off being raised in the home of their married mother and father. Legal recognition and support of the institution of marriage, therefore, is meant to contribute to monogamy, exclusivity, and permanence among heterosexual couples because from these relationships emerge the next generation of citizens, leaders, workers, soldiers, volunteers, etc. In the aggregate, the flourishing of the next generation depends on stable marriages that raise these children. This is not even an argument against same-sex unions; it stands on its own merit as an argument for the legal recognition and support of the union of husband and wife. Same-sex unions simply are not “publicly” consequential in the same ways that marriages are. This is not meant to be a degrading statement at all toward same-sex unions.
In sum, I said “we should ask whether the union of husband and wife involves a genuine public good, which is absent in same-sex unions,” and then I argued in the affirmative. Your two basic challenges to this assertion are good ones, but I believe they fall short.
I did not address the issue of civil unions or concerns about conscience protections, both of which I think are integral to this discussion, but I’ll leave those items to later responses I hope to provide to the regular contributors’ excellent essays in the coming days.
Thanks again for your challenging thoughts.
Nathan
John,
I appreciate your challenging comments. For clarification, I assume that your reference to “advocates of same sex unions” specifically means advocates of same-sex marriage, i.e., those who support the full application of marriage law to same-sex couples who seek to be “married.” The rest of my comments assume this to be the case.
First, you mention the potential for same-sex unions to contribute to a “genuine public good” by increasing the size of the adoption pool (surely a public good for anti-abortion folks, you suggest). I am opposed to abortion but would assert that gays and lesbians are such a small portion of the population, and those in stable, permanent relationships still a smaller portion, that encouraging evangelical and Catholic married couples to be more engaged in adoption would be exceedingly more fruitful for Christians who really seek to increase the adoption pool for children needing a home. In addition, in its May 2012 issue Christianity Today featured a discussion on how Christian organizations should approach laws mandating the placement of children with gay parents (http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2012/may/child-placement-programs.html?start=2). I’m still thinking through this broader issue and haven’t given it sufficient thought yet to conclude whether I would, in the first place, be willing to characterize an increase in the number same-sex couples willing to adopt as a “genuine public good.”
Second, I do believe that monogamy, permanence, and exclusivity among gay and lesbian couples is a genuine good but so are all sorts of sustained, loving friendships. This does not necessarily warrant their legal recognition and support as a matter of public justice. I think redefining marriage as a loving relationship between two adults rather than the union of husband and wife will lead to complex, deleterious legal entanglements, problematic cultural shifts, and further erosion of the meaning of conjugal marriage and its inherent connection to children. Basically, the union of husband and wife is distinct from other types of meaningful friendships (among which I would count many same-sex couples) because the political community (i.e., citizens in relation to government) has a genuine public interest in the sexual behavior of heterosexuals before children are conceived because of the possibility of children, and after children are conceived, because children deserve and are best off being raised in the home of their married mother and father. Legal recognition and support of the institution of marriage, therefore, is meant to contribute to monogamy, exclusivity, and permanence among heterosexual couples because from these relationships emerge the next generation of citizens, leaders, workers, soldiers, volunteers, etc. In the aggregate, the flourishing of the next generation depends on stable marriages that raise these children. This is not even an argument against same-sex unions; it stands on its own merit as an argument for the legal recognition and support of the union of husband and wife. Same-sex unions simply are not “publicly” consequential in the same ways that marriages are. This is not meant to be a degrading statement at all toward same-sex unions.
In sum, I said “we should ask whether the union of husband and wife involves a genuine public good, which is absent in same-sex unions,” and then I argued in the affirmative. Your two basic challenges to this assertion are good ones, but I believe they fall short.
I did not address the issue of civil unions or concerns about conscience protections, both of which I think are integral to this discussion, but I’ll leave those items to later responses I hope to provide to the regular contributors’ excellent essays in the coming days.
Thanks again for your challenging thoughts.
Nathan
John,
I appreciate your challenging comments. For clarification, I assume that your reference to “advocates of same sex unions” specifically means advocates of same-sex marriage, i.e., those who support the full application of marriage law to same-sex couples who seek to be “married.” The rest of my comments assume this to be the case.
First, you mention the potential for same-sex unions to contribute to a “genuine public good” by increasing the size of the adoption pool (surely a public good for anti-abortion folks, you suggest). I am opposed to abortion but would assert that gays and lesbians are such a small portion of the population, and those in stable, permanent relationships still a smaller portion, that encouraging evangelical and Catholic married couples to be more engaged in adoption would be exceedingly more fruitful for Christians who really seek to increase the adoption pool for children needing a home. In addition, in its May 2012 issue Christianity Today featured a discussion on how Christian organizations should approach laws mandating the placement of children with gay parents (http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2012/may/child-placement-programs.html?start=2). I’m still thinking through this broader issue and haven’t given it sufficient thought yet to conclude whether I would, in the first place, be willing to characterize an increase in the number same-sex couples willing to adopt as a “genuine public good.”
Second, I do believe that monogamy, permanence, and exclusivity among gay and lesbian couples is a genuine good but so are all sorts of sustained, loving friendships. This does not necessarily warrant their legal recognition and support as a matter of public justice. I think redefining marriage as a loving relationship between two adults rather than the union of husband and wife will lead to complex, deleterious legal entanglements, problematic cultural shifts, and further erosion of the meaning of conjugal marriage and its inherent connection to children. Basically, the union of husband and wife is distinct from other types of meaningful friendships (among which I would count many same-sex couples) because the political community (i.e., citizens in relation to government) has a genuine public interest in the sexual behavior of heterosexuals before children are conceived because of the possibility of children, and after children are conceived, because children deserve and are best off being raised in the home of their married mother and father. Legal recognition and support of the institution of marriage, therefore, is meant to contribute to monogamy, exclusivity, and permanence among heterosexual couples because from these relationships emerge the next generation of citizens, leaders, workers, soldiers, volunteers, etc. In the aggregate, the flourishing of the next generation depends on stable marriages that raise these children. This is not even an argument against same-sex unions; it stands on its own merit as an argument for the legal recognition and support of the union of husband and wife. Same-sex unions simply are not “publicly” consequential in the same ways that marriages are. This is not meant to be a degrading statement at all toward same-sex unions.
In sum, I said “we should ask whether the union of husband and wife involves a genuine public good, which is absent in same-sex unions,” and then I argued in the affirmative. Your two basic challenges to this assertion are good ones, but I believe they fall short.
I did not address the issue of civil unions or concerns about conscience protections, both of which I think are integral to this discussion, but I’ll leave those items to later responses I hope to provide to the regular contributors’ excellent essays in the coming days.
Thanks again for your challenging thoughts.
Nathan
Thanks for the thoughtful reply, Nathan. Since I'm engaged in PhD research in an entirely different area at present (early 19th century American missions), I don't have as much time as I should give to this subject, but I do need to make one more comment related to your argument that only heterosexual marriage constitutes a "public good" that furthers the interest of society in general.
Your argument, it seems to me, is being made on the basis of an apparent objectivity that, in fact, is reflective of a pre-determined bias that would be rejected by those who advocate differently. I find it particularly in this quote: "Same-sex unions simply are not “publicly” consequential in the same ways that marriages are", an argument you make primarily based on the proper relational mode for raising a family. I'm not sure this is true, as it suggests that children raised in single parent families or by same sex partners (whose relationship is solidified and validated by marriage) will not be able to function at the same level as others to the detriment of who? society? the children themselves? Is there evidence that this is true? Not that I have seen. As for the perpetuation of the race (as older writings would have put it), your very admission that same sex unions are a small segment of the population belies the assumption being made here – that somehow the good of society would be hindered if same sex unions were validated with marriage.
I, by the way, am not necessarily an advocate of same sex marriage. I'm sitting on the fence on this one. I just don't think the arguments you are advancing have as much validity as you think they do. I'm almost certain they would not convince any of my gay friends who are advocates for same sex marriage.
Thanks for the thoughtful reply, Nathan. Since I'm engaged in PhD research in an entirely different area at present (early 19th century American missions), I don't have as much time as I should give to this subject, but I do need to make one more comment related to your argument that only heterosexual marriage constitutes a "public good" that furthers the interest of society in general.
Your argument, it seems to me, is being made on the basis of an apparent objectivity that, in fact, is reflective of a pre-determined bias that would be rejected by those who advocate differently. I find it particularly in this quote: "Same-sex unions simply are not “publicly” consequential in the same ways that marriages are", an argument you make primarily based on the proper relational mode for raising a family. I'm not sure this is true, as it suggests that children raised in single parent families or by same sex partners (whose relationship is solidified and validated by marriage) will not be able to function at the same level as others to the detriment of who? society? the children themselves? Is there evidence that this is true? Not that I have seen. As for the perpetuation of the race (as older writings would have put it), your very admission that same sex unions are a small segment of the population belies the assumption being made here – that somehow the good of society would be hindered if same sex unions were validated with marriage.
I, by the way, am not necessarily an advocate of same sex marriage. I'm sitting on the fence on this one. I just don't think the arguments you are advancing have as much validity as you think they do. I'm almost certain they would not convince any of my gay friends who are advocates for same sex marriage.
Thanks for the thoughtful reply, Nathan. Since I'm engaged in PhD research in an entirely different area at present (early 19th century American missions), I don't have as much time as I should give to this subject, but I do need to make one more comment related to your argument that only heterosexual marriage constitutes a "public good" that furthers the interest of society in general.
Your argument, it seems to me, is being made on the basis of an apparent objectivity that, in fact, is reflective of a pre-determined bias that would be rejected by those who advocate differently. I find it particularly in this quote: "Same-sex unions simply are not “publicly” consequential in the same ways that marriages are", an argument you make primarily based on the proper relational mode for raising a family. I'm not sure this is true, as it suggests that children raised in single parent families or by same sex partners (whose relationship is solidified and validated by marriage) will not be able to function at the same level as others to the detriment of who? society? the children themselves? Is there evidence that this is true? Not that I have seen. As for the perpetuation of the race (as older writings would have put it), your very admission that same sex unions are a small segment of the population belies the assumption being made here – that somehow the good of society would be hindered if same sex unions were validated with marriage.
I, by the way, am not necessarily an advocate of same sex marriage. I'm sitting on the fence on this one. I just don't think the arguments you are advancing have as much validity as you think they do. I'm almost certain they would not convince any of my gay friends who are advocates for same sex marriage.
John,
You wrote in response to me: “Your argument, it seems to me, is being made on the basis of an apparent objectivity that, in fact, is reflective of a pre-determined bias that would be rejected by those who advocate differently.”
Correct. Such is the case with most moral-political arguments. I think the critical underlying question is, what is the basis for my “pre-determined bias” and on what basis do advocates of same-sex marriage reject my “pre-determined bias” (which might also be called my reasoned presupposition). At the most basic level, my whole view on this issue is predicated on the idea that the union of husband and wife and same-sex union are different “things.” The union of husband and wife and same-sex union are different not in “degree” but in “kind.” A claim of moral superiority of the former over the latter is NOT required to make this distinction. Potential for full bodily union (complementarity of the body), potential for life generation, and the uniting of the two, distinct halves of humanity–these attributes are sufficient to support the claim that the union of husband and wife is a different “thing” than same-sex union.
Historically, diverse human societies, with limited deviation, have institutionalized the marriage relationship in various ways through the public recognition of the man and woman who enter into it. Normatively (and I think historically) we should characterize this public recognition as an act of the governing authority extending recognition (rights and responsibilities) to an institution that exists prior to the political bond. In the west at least, many have argued, the state developed marriage law with the union of husband and wife in mind because the raising of children by the two people who came together to create them has been deemed morally and practically critical to the state and the society over which it governs.
What I’m really arguing relates to a comment by Paul Brink where he asks, “Should the state apply the label of “marriage” to [same-sex] relationships? I don’t think it should, especially as we should avoid the implication that marriage is somehow a creation of the state.” The institution of marriage, i.e., the practice of uniting husband and wife in a life-long, monogamous relationship was not created by the state through the positivization of marriage law but was instead a response to the institution. Therefore, marriage law should not be applied to non-marital relationships. Rather, a separate political deliberation should take place that considers what legal rights and benefits, if any, ought to be extended to another institution, i.e., same-sex union. On its own terms, based on its own distinctive attributes, the political-legal deliberation should unfold. I believe we should strenuously avoid the revision of the definition of the object of marriage law, i.e., the institution of marriage itself. It would be a grave mistake to legally define marriage solely as a sustained relationship of romantic love entered into by free persons. Many believe such a revision is right and just because it would open the door to same-sex couples to be legally married, but this would sever the connection between the institution of marriage and children. Furthermore, in principle this definition would require the extension of marriage law to polyamorous unions for those who seek it. These three or more person relationships could not be denied because to do so would be a violation of their civil rights. It is often argued that culture is upstream from politics, but changes in law also have lasting impacts on culture, and I believe a redefinition of marriage similar to what I just described would have a lasting cultural impact.
You wrote in your response to me: “I just don't think the arguments you are advancing have as much validity as you think they do. I'm almost certain they would not convince any of my gay friends who are advocates for same sex marriage.”
It is the reasons your gay friends would not be convinced by my argument that I’d be most interested in, not the fact that they wouldn’t be convinced. I suspect that most of your friends, gay and straight, (like many of mine) view this issue as a civil rights matter. They view marriage law as it currently stands in most states as denying a whole class of people equal protection and treatment before the law (some even citing the 14th amendment). Now, and I mean this genuinely, if you (and they) come to view this issue as a civil rights matter then there is only one position to take: same-sex marriage should be permitted by law, by a ruling of the Supreme
Court if necessary. Civil rights should be extended to all, without prejudice. However, I reject that this is a civil rights issue (if I come to believe otherwise, I will change my position). All adults have the right to enter into marriage and to have their union recognized by marriage law, but some people don’t want a marriage, they want something else. Therefore, civil rights are not violated and are not at issue here.
Thanks again,
Nathan
John,
You wrote in response to me: “Your argument, it seems to me, is being made on the basis of an apparent objectivity that, in fact, is reflective of a pre-determined bias that would be rejected by those who advocate differently.”
Correct. Such is the case with most moral-political arguments. I think the critical underlying question is, what is the basis for my “pre-determined bias” and on what basis do advocates of same-sex marriage reject my “pre-determined bias” (which might also be called my reasoned presupposition). At the most basic level, my whole view on this issue is predicated on the idea that the union of husband and wife and same-sex union are different “things.” The union of husband and wife and same-sex union are different not in “degree” but in “kind.” A claim of moral superiority of the former over the latter is NOT required to make this distinction. Potential for full bodily union (complementarity of the body), potential for life generation, and the uniting of the two, distinct halves of humanity–these attributes are sufficient to support the claim that the union of husband and wife is a different “thing” than same-sex union.
Historically, diverse human societies, with limited deviation, have institutionalized the marriage relationship in various ways through the public recognition of the man and woman who enter into it. Normatively (and I think historically) we should characterize this public recognition as an act of the governing authority extending recognition (rights and responsibilities) to an institution that exists prior to the political bond. In the west at least, many have argued, the state developed marriage law with the union of husband and wife in mind because the raising of children by the two people who came together to create them has been deemed morally and practically critical to the state and the society over which it governs.
What I’m really arguing relates to a comment by Paul Brink where he asks, “Should the state apply the label of “marriage” to [same-sex] relationships? I don’t think it should, especially as we should avoid the implication that marriage is somehow a creation of the state.” The institution of marriage, i.e., the practice of uniting husband and wife in a life-long, monogamous relationship was not created by the state through the positivization of marriage law but was instead a response to the institution. Therefore, marriage law should not be applied to non-marital relationships. Rather, a separate political deliberation should take place that considers what legal rights and benefits, if any, ought to be extended to another institution, i.e., same-sex union. On its own terms, based on its own distinctive attributes, the political-legal deliberation should unfold. I believe we should strenuously avoid the revision of the definition of the object of marriage law, i.e., the institution of marriage itself. It would be a grave mistake to legally define marriage solely as a sustained relationship of romantic love entered into by free persons. Many believe such a revision is right and just because it would open the door to same-sex couples to be legally married, but this would sever the connection between the institution of marriage and children. Furthermore, in principle this definition would require the extension of marriage law to polyamorous unions for those who seek it. These three or more person relationships could not be denied because to do so would be a violation of their civil rights. It is often argued that culture is upstream from politics, but changes in law also have lasting impacts on culture, and I believe a redefinition of marriage similar to what I just described would have a lasting cultural impact.
You wrote in your response to me: “I just don't think the arguments you are advancing have as much validity as you think they do. I'm almost certain they would not convince any of my gay friends who are advocates for same sex marriage.”
It is the reasons your gay friends would not be convinced by my argument that I’d be most interested in, not the fact that they wouldn’t be convinced. I suspect that most of your friends, gay and straight, (like many of mine) view this issue as a civil rights matter. They view marriage law as it currently stands in most states as denying a whole class of people equal protection and treatment before the law (some even citing the 14th amendment). Now, and I mean this genuinely, if you (and they) come to view this issue as a civil rights matter then there is only one position to take: same-sex marriage should be permitted by law, by a ruling of the Supreme
Court if necessary. Civil rights should be extended to all, without prejudice. However, I reject that this is a civil rights issue (if I come to believe otherwise, I will change my position). All adults have the right to enter into marriage and to have their union recognized by marriage law, but some people don’t want a marriage, they want something else. Therefore, civil rights are not violated and are not at issue here.
Thanks again,
Nathan
John,
You wrote in response to me: “Your argument, it seems to me, is being made on the basis of an apparent objectivity that, in fact, is reflective of a pre-determined bias that would be rejected by those who advocate differently.”
Correct. Such is the case with most moral-political arguments. I think the critical underlying question is, what is the basis for my “pre-determined bias” and on what basis do advocates of same-sex marriage reject my “pre-determined bias” (which might also be called my reasoned presupposition). At the most basic level, my whole view on this issue is predicated on the idea that the union of husband and wife and same-sex union are different “things.” The union of husband and wife and same-sex union are different not in “degree” but in “kind.” A claim of moral superiority of the former over the latter is NOT required to make this distinction. Potential for full bodily union (complementarity of the body), potential for life generation, and the uniting of the two, distinct halves of humanity–these attributes are sufficient to support the claim that the union of husband and wife is a different “thing” than same-sex union.
Historically, diverse human societies, with limited deviation, have institutionalized the marriage relationship in various ways through the public recognition of the man and woman who enter into it. Normatively (and I think historically) we should characterize this public recognition as an act of the governing authority extending recognition (rights and responsibilities) to an institution that exists prior to the political bond. In the west at least, many have argued, the state developed marriage law with the union of husband and wife in mind because the raising of children by the two people who came together to create them has been deemed morally and practically critical to the state and the society over which it governs.
What I’m really arguing relates to a comment by Paul Brink where he asks, “Should the state apply the label of “marriage” to [same-sex] relationships? I don’t think it should, especially as we should avoid the implication that marriage is somehow a creation of the state.” The institution of marriage, i.e., the practice of uniting husband and wife in a life-long, monogamous relationship was not created by the state through the positivization of marriage law but was instead a response to the institution. Therefore, marriage law should not be applied to non-marital relationships. Rather, a separate political deliberation should take place that considers what legal rights and benefits, if any, ought to be extended to another institution, i.e., same-sex union. On its own terms, based on its own distinctive attributes, the political-legal deliberation should unfold. I believe we should strenuously avoid the revision of the definition of the object of marriage law, i.e., the institution of marriage itself. It would be a grave mistake to legally define marriage solely as a sustained relationship of romantic love entered into by free persons. Many believe such a revision is right and just because it would open the door to same-sex couples to be legally married, but this would sever the connection between the institution of marriage and children. Furthermore, in principle this definition would require the extension of marriage law to polyamorous unions for those who seek it. These three or more person relationships could not be denied because to do so would be a violation of their civil rights. It is often argued that culture is upstream from politics, but changes in law also have lasting impacts on culture, and I believe a redefinition of marriage similar to what I just described would have a lasting cultural impact.
You wrote in your response to me: “I just don't think the arguments you are advancing have as much validity as you think they do. I'm almost certain they would not convince any of my gay friends who are advocates for same sex marriage.”
It is the reasons your gay friends would not be convinced by my argument that I’d be most interested in, not the fact that they wouldn’t be convinced. I suspect that most of your friends, gay and straight, (like many of mine) view this issue as a civil rights matter. They view marriage law as it currently stands in most states as denying a whole class of people equal protection and treatment before the law (some even citing the 14th amendment). Now, and I mean this genuinely, if you (and they) come to view this issue as a civil rights matter then there is only one position to take: same-sex marriage should be permitted by law, by a ruling of the Supreme
Court if necessary. Civil rights should be extended to all, without prejudice. However, I reject that this is a civil rights issue (if I come to believe otherwise, I will change my position). All adults have the right to enter into marriage and to have their union recognized by marriage law, but some people don’t want a marriage, they want something else. Therefore, civil rights are not violated and are not at issue here.
Thanks again,
Nathan
Actually, Nathan, the reason behind my previous response had to do with the research I've been doing on early American theology, as your argument had the markings of what was known at that time as Scottish Common Sense Realism, which was the touchstone philosophy for evangelicals in the early 19th century (and remains so today without giving it this name). In this case an argument is made on the basis of what is assumed to be common sense logic (i.e. logic that any rational human being would accept), but it is "common sense" based on a biblically structured Christian world view. It seems unassailable to the person making the case, but only because said person assumes that "common sense" would lead any rational thinker to accept the logic inherent in the premise.
At this point I'm going to ask a friend of mine who is a gay Lutheran theologian to respond, as I am curious as to how he might respond to your argument. I'll try to persuade him to jump into the discussion.
Actually, Nathan, the reason behind my previous response had to do with the research I've been doing on early American theology, as your argument had the markings of what was known at that time as Scottish Common Sense Realism, which was the touchstone philosophy for evangelicals in the early 19th century (and remains so today without giving it this name). In this case an argument is made on the basis of what is assumed to be common sense logic (i.e. logic that any rational human being would accept), but it is "common sense" based on a biblically structured Christian world view. It seems unassailable to the person making the case, but only because said person assumes that "common sense" would lead any rational thinker to accept the logic inherent in the premise.
At this point I'm going to ask a friend of mine who is a gay Lutheran theologian to respond, as I am curious as to how he might respond to your argument. I'll try to persuade him to jump into the discussion.
Actually, Nathan, the reason behind my previous response had to do with the research I've been doing on early American theology, as your argument had the markings of what was known at that time as Scottish Common Sense Realism, which was the touchstone philosophy for evangelicals in the early 19th century (and remains so today without giving it this name). In this case an argument is made on the basis of what is assumed to be common sense logic (i.e. logic that any rational human being would accept), but it is "common sense" based on a biblically structured Christian world view. It seems unassailable to the person making the case, but only because said person assumes that "common sense" would lead any rational thinker to accept the logic inherent in the premise.
At this point I'm going to ask a friend of mine who is a gay Lutheran theologian to respond, as I am curious as to how he might respond to your argument. I'll try to persuade him to jump into the discussion.
John
I am not familiar with Scottish Common Sense Realism, and we may be closing in fast on the limits of my ability to give a nuanced account of my philosophical approach given my lack of much formal training in philosophy. So I’ll respond with a few points, which I hope clarify my thinking or at least the premises from which I’m attempting to make my case.
To start, I mention Herman Dooyeweerd below, and I haven’t grappled much with him directly so as I’ve tried to think through his distinct perspective within the reformed tradition it has been through Jonathan Chaplin’s book on Dooyeweerd and, especially, through reading James Skillen’s work and several discussions with him over the past year (disclaimer: for all the ways that I contradict this sort of reformed thinking, the failure is all mine!). I’ve also tried to delve into the Catholic natural law tradition and have recently waded into its expression in Robert George.
A few points to sketch my presuppositions:
1. There is a created order that structures human life, the observance of which is integral to human flourishing.
2. Human sin profoundly distorts, but does not destroy, the human capacity to discern, and even pursue, human flourishing.
3. “Christian philosophy….is philosophy that takes up a common philosophical task—as a systematic theoretical investigation of the deepest structures of reality—from the perspective of and as penetrated and guided by the Christian religion….” (Jonathan Chaplin, “Herman Dooyeweerd,” 40) The implication here is that the created order can, in part, be discovered by investigating the diverse spheres of human (and non-human) life and the distinct, qualifying modes in which those spheres are ordered and have their identity. But, of course, this investigation assumes a coherence to reality—a created order.
4. All philosophical reflection is dependent upon religious presuppositions or a religious ground-motive. (the word “religious” must be properly defined here to mean something like worldview or comprehensive view of life and way of life). (I hope the religious ground-motive that pervades my philosophical approach is the narrative of creation, fall, redemption, consummation.)
5. Common reasoning across “convictional boundaries” is difficult but possible and necessary for a peaceable order to exist in a highly pluralistic society like ours.
As alluded to above, I am often compelled by the natural law philosophy of folks like Robert George, as well as, the broader Catholic natural law tradition. My exposure to Aquinas like Dooyeweerd, however, has been mostly through secondary sources. Inherent in this tradition as I’ve heard it expressed is that common reasoning is possible without explicit reference to one’s view of revelation—the continuance, I guess, of nature/grace dualism. The concern that Dooyeweerd and many reformed thinkers had and have with the Thomistic tradition, with all its tremendous strengths, is that it gives human reason too much autonomy, and therefore, was and is prone to “alien” ground motives creeping in among its adherents without them realizing it. But you can see this approach evidenced in an article (also referenced in Eric Teetsel’s essay) in the Harvard Law Review by Robert George (and two others called) “What is Marriage?”. The authors waste no time stating explicitly that their argument is not based in any particular religious tradition but can be accessed and assessed by appeal to natural law (you would probably notice fairly quickly that much of my thinking on same-sex marriage is based on that article). But then how do I reconcile this kind of natural law thinking with a belief that religious ground-motives are the foundation for all philosophical reflection (and all other areas of human life for that matter)? And yet even Herman Dooyeweerd asserted that some reasoning across “convictional boundaries” is possible. I have yet to find a way to adequately reconcile these things.
Nevertheless, to address your response more directly, for practical reasons that depend largely on who I’m talking to and the amount of time I have, I don’t articulate my religious worldview with each encounter and do try to appeal to some sort of limited common reason, like, for instance, when I argued that the union of husband and wife and same-sex union are different “things.” And then I named three attributes that clearly distinguish marriages from same-sex unions. Now, someone might dismiss these differences as inconsequential, but we can at least work toward acknowledging that those differences exist.
In sum, I would readily admit that my view on marriage and marriage law is based on a Christian worldview, and I hope I can more fully align my thinking with such a view as God gives me eyes to see and as I continue to repent of those things that demand repentance. Furthermore, I do not assume any robust “common sense logic” exists in the world in which I live (I reside in DC). I’ve tried to make this argument with as much honesty and thought as I can muster, but it would surely get me branded a bigot or worse in most social situations that I find myself in, at least with persons in my general age group. However, and I need to give this more thought, I do believe Christianity offers a plausible and compelling account of reality. Thus, there is space here for appealing to some degree of common rationality. Christianity leads me to assume a created order that actually exists and that we all occupy and are subject to, together. But, I think Christianity also gives a radical account of reality and includes extreme demands for all who enter into its ways. I suppose I believe common rationality quickly finds its limits in this second account. Can both these accounts be true of Christianity? I believe they must.
Lastly, you wrote, “[Common sense logic] seems unassailable to the person making the case, but only because said person assumes that "common sense" would lead any rational thinker to accept the logic inherent in the premise.” Is this a charge you would also level against people who argue that same-sex marriage is a civil rights matter? Or is it somehow inherent in the “kind” of argument I’ve tried to make? What are the contours of an authentically Christian argument in the diverse public square from your perspective? Does it in every instance articulate its religious presuppositions regardless of context to avoid the impression that it is assuming some specious common sense logic that doesn’t really exist?
Once again, thank you for continuing to challenge me. And I look forward to possibly hearing your friend’s thoughts.
Nathan
John
I am not familiar with Scottish Common Sense Realism, and we may be closing in fast on the limits of my ability to give a nuanced account of my philosophical approach given my lack of much formal training in philosophy. So I’ll respond with a few points, which I hope clarify my thinking or at least the premises from which I’m attempting to make my case.
To start, I mention Herman Dooyeweerd below, and I haven’t grappled much with him directly so as I’ve tried to think through his distinct perspective within the reformed tradition it has been through Jonathan Chaplin’s book on Dooyeweerd and, especially, through reading James Skillen’s work and several discussions with him over the past year (disclaimer: for all the ways that I contradict this sort of reformed thinking, the failure is all mine!). I’ve also tried to delve into the Catholic natural law tradition and have recently waded into its expression in Robert George.
A few points to sketch my presuppositions:
1. There is a created order that structures human life, the observance of which is integral to human flourishing.
2. Human sin profoundly distorts, but does not destroy, the human capacity to discern, and even pursue, human flourishing.
3. “Christian philosophy….is philosophy that takes up a common philosophical task—as a systematic theoretical investigation of the deepest structures of reality—from the perspective of and as penetrated and guided by the Christian religion….” (Jonathan Chaplin, “Herman Dooyeweerd,” 40) The implication here is that the created order can, in part, be discovered by investigating the diverse spheres of human (and non-human) life and the distinct, qualifying modes in which those spheres are ordered and have their identity. But, of course, this investigation assumes a coherence to reality—a created order.
4. All philosophical reflection is dependent upon religious presuppositions or a religious ground-motive. (the word “religious” must be properly defined here to mean something like worldview or comprehensive view of life and way of life). (I hope the religious ground-motive that pervades my philosophical approach is the narrative of creation, fall, redemption, consummation.)
5. Common reasoning across “convictional boundaries” is difficult but possible and necessary for a peaceable order to exist in a highly pluralistic society like ours.
As alluded to above, I am often compelled by the natural law philosophy of folks like Robert George, as well as, the broader Catholic natural law tradition. My exposure to Aquinas like Dooyeweerd, however, has been mostly through secondary sources. Inherent in this tradition as I’ve heard it expressed is that common reasoning is possible without explicit reference to one’s view of revelation—the continuance, I guess, of nature/grace dualism. The concern that Dooyeweerd and many reformed thinkers had and have with the Thomistic tradition, with all its tremendous strengths, is that it gives human reason too much autonomy, and therefore, was and is prone to “alien” ground motives creeping in among its adherents without them realizing it. But you can see this approach evidenced in an article (also referenced in Eric Teetsel’s essay) in the Harvard Law Review by Robert George (and two others called) “What is Marriage?”. The authors waste no time stating explicitly that their argument is not based in any particular religious tradition but can be accessed and assessed by appeal to natural law (you would probably notice fairly quickly that much of my thinking on same-sex marriage is based on that article). But then how do I reconcile this kind of natural law thinking with a belief that religious ground-motives are the foundation for all philosophical reflection (and all other areas of human life for that matter)? And yet even Herman Dooyeweerd asserted that some reasoning across “convictional boundaries” is possible. I have yet to find a way to adequately reconcile these things.
Nevertheless, to address your response more directly, for practical reasons that depend largely on who I’m talking to and the amount of time I have, I don’t articulate my religious worldview with each encounter and do try to appeal to some sort of limited common reason, like, for instance, when I argued that the union of husband and wife and same-sex union are different “things.” And then I named three attributes that clearly distinguish marriages from same-sex unions. Now, someone might dismiss these differences as inconsequential, but we can at least work toward acknowledging that those differences exist.
In sum, I would readily admit that my view on marriage and marriage law is based on a Christian worldview, and I hope I can more fully align my thinking with such a view as God gives me eyes to see and as I continue to repent of those things that demand repentance. Furthermore, I do not assume any robust “common sense logic” exists in the world in which I live (I reside in DC). I’ve tried to make this argument with as much honesty and thought as I can muster, but it would surely get me branded a bigot or worse in most social situations that I find myself in, at least with persons in my general age group. However, and I need to give this more thought, I do believe Christianity offers a plausible and compelling account of reality. Thus, there is space here for appealing to some degree of common rationality. Christianity leads me to assume a created order that actually exists and that we all occupy and are subject to, together. But, I think Christianity also gives a radical account of reality and includes extreme demands for all who enter into its ways. I suppose I believe common rationality quickly finds its limits in this second account. Can both these accounts be true of Christianity? I believe they must.
Lastly, you wrote, “[Common sense logic] seems unassailable to the person making the case, but only because said person assumes that "common sense" would lead any rational thinker to accept the logic inherent in the premise.” Is this a charge you would also level against people who argue that same-sex marriage is a civil rights matter? Or is it somehow inherent in the “kind” of argument I’ve tried to make? What are the contours of an authentically Christian argument in the diverse public square from your perspective? Does it in every instance articulate its religious presuppositions regardless of context to avoid the impression that it is assuming some specious common sense logic that doesn’t really exist?
Once again, thank you for continuing to challenge me. And I look forward to possibly hearing your friend’s thoughts.
Nathan
John
I am not familiar with Scottish Common Sense Realism, and we may be closing in fast on the limits of my ability to give a nuanced account of my philosophical approach given my lack of much formal training in philosophy. So I’ll respond with a few points, which I hope clarify my thinking or at least the premises from which I’m attempting to make my case.
To start, I mention Herman Dooyeweerd below, and I haven’t grappled much with him directly so as I’ve tried to think through his distinct perspective within the reformed tradition it has been through Jonathan Chaplin’s book on Dooyeweerd and, especially, through reading James Skillen’s work and several discussions with him over the past year (disclaimer: for all the ways that I contradict this sort of reformed thinking, the failure is all mine!). I’ve also tried to delve into the Catholic natural law tradition and have recently waded into its expression in Robert George.
A few points to sketch my presuppositions:
1. There is a created order that structures human life, the observance of which is integral to human flourishing.
2. Human sin profoundly distorts, but does not destroy, the human capacity to discern, and even pursue, human flourishing.
3. “Christian philosophy….is philosophy that takes up a common philosophical task—as a systematic theoretical investigation of the deepest structures of reality—from the perspective of and as penetrated and guided by the Christian religion….” (Jonathan Chaplin, “Herman Dooyeweerd,” 40) The implication here is that the created order can, in part, be discovered by investigating the diverse spheres of human (and non-human) life and the distinct, qualifying modes in which those spheres are ordered and have their identity. But, of course, this investigation assumes a coherence to reality—a created order.
4. All philosophical reflection is dependent upon religious presuppositions or a religious ground-motive. (the word “religious” must be properly defined here to mean something like worldview or comprehensive view of life and way of life). (I hope the religious ground-motive that pervades my philosophical approach is the narrative of creation, fall, redemption, consummation.)
5. Common reasoning across “convictional boundaries” is difficult but possible and necessary for a peaceable order to exist in a highly pluralistic society like ours.
As alluded to above, I am often compelled by the natural law philosophy of folks like Robert George, as well as, the broader Catholic natural law tradition. My exposure to Aquinas like Dooyeweerd, however, has been mostly through secondary sources. Inherent in this tradition as I’ve heard it expressed is that common reasoning is possible without explicit reference to one’s view of revelation—the continuance, I guess, of nature/grace dualism. The concern that Dooyeweerd and many reformed thinkers had and have with the Thomistic tradition, with all its tremendous strengths, is that it gives human reason too much autonomy, and therefore, was and is prone to “alien” ground motives creeping in among its adherents without them realizing it. But you can see this approach evidenced in an article (also referenced in Eric Teetsel’s essay) in the Harvard Law Review by Robert George (and two others called) “What is Marriage?”. The authors waste no time stating explicitly that their argument is not based in any particular religious tradition but can be accessed and assessed by appeal to natural law (you would probably notice fairly quickly that much of my thinking on same-sex marriage is based on that article). But then how do I reconcile this kind of natural law thinking with a belief that religious ground-motives are the foundation for all philosophical reflection (and all other areas of human life for that matter)? And yet even Herman Dooyeweerd asserted that some reasoning across “convictional boundaries” is possible. I have yet to find a way to adequately reconcile these things.
Nevertheless, to address your response more directly, for practical reasons that depend largely on who I’m talking to and the amount of time I have, I don’t articulate my religious worldview with each encounter and do try to appeal to some sort of limited common reason, like, for instance, when I argued that the union of husband and wife and same-sex union are different “things.” And then I named three attributes that clearly distinguish marriages from same-sex unions. Now, someone might dismiss these differences as inconsequential, but we can at least work toward acknowledging that those differences exist.
In sum, I would readily admit that my view on marriage and marriage law is based on a Christian worldview, and I hope I can more fully align my thinking with such a view as God gives me eyes to see and as I continue to repent of those things that demand repentance. Furthermore, I do not assume any robust “common sense logic” exists in the world in which I live (I reside in DC). I’ve tried to make this argument with as much honesty and thought as I can muster, but it would surely get me branded a bigot or worse in most social situations that I find myself in, at least with persons in my general age group. However, and I need to give this more thought, I do believe Christianity offers a plausible and compelling account of reality. Thus, there is space here for appealing to some degree of common rationality. Christianity leads me to assume a created order that actually exists and that we all occupy and are subject to, together. But, I think Christianity also gives a radical account of reality and includes extreme demands for all who enter into its ways. I suppose I believe common rationality quickly finds its limits in this second account. Can both these accounts be true of Christianity? I believe they must.
Lastly, you wrote, “[Common sense logic] seems unassailable to the person making the case, but only because said person assumes that "common sense" would lead any rational thinker to accept the logic inherent in the premise.” Is this a charge you would also level against people who argue that same-sex marriage is a civil rights matter? Or is it somehow inherent in the “kind” of argument I’ve tried to make? What are the contours of an authentically Christian argument in the diverse public square from your perspective? Does it in every instance articulate its religious presuppositions regardless of context to avoid the impression that it is assuming some specious common sense logic that doesn’t really exist?
Once again, thank you for continuing to challenge me. And I look forward to possibly hearing your friend’s thoughts.
Nathan
Hi, Nathan,
I haven't heard from my friend yet, but do hope he responds. As for Common Sense Realism Dooyeweerd is, perhaps, a good Dutch representation of the philosophy as captured in point #1:
1. There is a created order that structures human life, the observance of which is integral to human flourishing.
The assumption behind this is thoroughly Christian – as the "created order" in this case would be assumed to be the order reflected in the biblical account. The assumption here, then, is that "common sense" tells us that the world as it is is the world as the Bible reveals it to be. In point of fact, the Biblical account is just one of many "world views" that attempt to describe the world "as it is." Hindus, for instance, would challenge the linear nature of the biblical account, not to mention the very term "created order." Buddhists would make the assumption that the world "as it is" is illusion with a similar rejection of "created order." Thus what appears to be a common sense understanding of reality is, in fact, a Christian construct of reality, only "common sense" to those who prescribe to the authoritative voice of Judeo-Christian scripture.
As long as our society remained thoroughly grounded in this particular view of reality (which early 19th century Calvinists and apparently Dooyeweerd assumed to be "common sense") we could make authoritative claims like yours about what constitutes the "public good". But given our growing pluralism and the de-sacralization of public discourse I'm not sure we can make such claims with any kind of valid authority for all Americans.
And now back to those early 19th century Christians who had their own battles to fight with Unitarians and Deists and whomever else challenged their "common sense."
Hi, Nathan,
I haven't heard from my friend yet, but do hope he responds. As for Common Sense Realism Dooyeweerd is, perhaps, a good Dutch representation of the philosophy as captured in point #1:
1. There is a created order that structures human life, the observance of which is integral to human flourishing.
The assumption behind this is thoroughly Christian – as the "created order" in this case would be assumed to be the order reflected in the biblical account. The assumption here, then, is that "common sense" tells us that the world as it is is the world as the Bible reveals it to be. In point of fact, the Biblical account is just one of many "world views" that attempt to describe the world "as it is." Hindus, for instance, would challenge the linear nature of the biblical account, not to mention the very term "created order." Buddhists would make the assumption that the world "as it is" is illusion with a similar rejection of "created order." Thus what appears to be a common sense understanding of reality is, in fact, a Christian construct of reality, only "common sense" to those who prescribe to the authoritative voice of Judeo-Christian scripture.
As long as our society remained thoroughly grounded in this particular view of reality (which early 19th century Calvinists and apparently Dooyeweerd assumed to be "common sense") we could make authoritative claims like yours about what constitutes the "public good". But given our growing pluralism and the de-sacralization of public discourse I'm not sure we can make such claims with any kind of valid authority for all Americans.
And now back to those early 19th century Christians who had their own battles to fight with Unitarians and Deists and whomever else challenged their "common sense."
Hi, Nathan,
I haven't heard from my friend yet, but do hope he responds. As for Common Sense Realism Dooyeweerd is, perhaps, a good Dutch representation of the philosophy as captured in point #1:
1. There is a created order that structures human life, the observance of which is integral to human flourishing.
The assumption behind this is thoroughly Christian – as the "created order" in this case would be assumed to be the order reflected in the biblical account. The assumption here, then, is that "common sense" tells us that the world as it is is the world as the Bible reveals it to be. In point of fact, the Biblical account is just one of many "world views" that attempt to describe the world "as it is." Hindus, for instance, would challenge the linear nature of the biblical account, not to mention the very term "created order." Buddhists would make the assumption that the world "as it is" is illusion with a similar rejection of "created order." Thus what appears to be a common sense understanding of reality is, in fact, a Christian construct of reality, only "common sense" to those who prescribe to the authoritative voice of Judeo-Christian scripture.
As long as our society remained thoroughly grounded in this particular view of reality (which early 19th century Calvinists and apparently Dooyeweerd assumed to be "common sense") we could make authoritative claims like yours about what constitutes the "public good". But given our growing pluralism and the de-sacralization of public discourse I'm not sure we can make such claims with any kind of valid authority for all Americans.
And now back to those early 19th century Christians who had their own battles to fight with Unitarians and Deists and whomever else challenged their "common sense."
John,
You write: “In point of fact, the Biblical account is just one of many "world views" that attempt to describe the world ‘as it is.’”
And later you write: “given our growing pluralism and the de-sacralization of public discourse I'm not sure we can make such claims with any kind of valid authority for all Americans.”
The essence of your response cuts right to the heart of the dilemma of our age, politically and otherwise. How could I have the audacity to: (1) make a claim about the distinctiveness of marriage in relation to same-sex union, (2) assert that the distinction is at least in part based in a particular view of the created order (a concept, as you suggest, that is unintelligible to so many), and (3) further claim that marriage ought to receive special legal recognition and support because it is somehow integral to the public good in a way that other interpersonal relationships are not. And then I emphasize that the proper jurisdiction and competence of the state is to engage in those activities pertaining to the public good and not other goods, goods which may be important, but are either within the jurisdiction of other “institutions” (e.g., families, businesses, schools, universities, charities, trade unions, neighborhood associations, churches, mosques, friendships, and many others) or of individual persons. Critical to my argument is that the state ought only to be involved in those activities/enterprises/initiatives that pertain to public goods in order to advance public justice.
Please note, unless the political community (citizens in relation to government) is a comprehensive and all-consuming community then a distinction between those goods that are public, and within the domain of the state, and those things which are the domain of other, non-governmental spheres of life, must be made. As James Skillen has said and written in various ways, one of the most critical tasks of government is properly defining those areas of life which are non-governmental. If government fails to do this well, it risks introducing its coercive apparatus into spheres of life where non-coercive instruments and norms ought to be fully operative. To illustrate, if people in a given country were somehow coerced to be Christians, the Church could not rightly be said to be growing in number because a critical aspect of the religious sphere of life is that it is entered into without coercion. The same could be said of a friendship; coercion cannot operate within its bounds because neither the one coercing nor the coerced could rightly be said to be engaged in the free-giving, reciprocal exchanges of friendship.
All this is to say, discerning what constitutes the “public good” from other, non-public goods is an absolutely inevitable aspect of political deliberation, unless, of course, one is arguing for totalitarianism, which makes all areas of life the domain of the political community. One of the central elements of Dooyeweerd’s (and Skillen’s and Christian reformed thinking from Calvin through Kuyper to the present) and Catholic social teaching is different (but at times parallel) ways, is an attempt to discern the proper jurisdiction and competence of the state in order to offer a normative account of principled pluralism. Surely some things must be crimes investigated/prosecuted by the state, some things must be promoted by the state, some things must be coordinated by the state, some disputes must be adjudicated by the state, and so on. Discerning the proper contours/limits of these things is the essence of public justice, the task of advancing the public good. To illustrate, government should not tell parents how to love and respect their children but may justly prohibit physical abuse visited by parents upon their children and intervene by force if necessary to stop it.
This task of discerning the boundaries of the public good quickly takes us into worldview-level questions. So when you say, “the Biblical account is just one of many "world views" that attempt to describe the world ‘as it is,’” I respectfully say that you haven’t gotten us very far with respect to helping us figure out how to live peaceably in a pluralistic society. People like James Skillen, I think, would say the Christian view of things seeks to robustly protect pluralism, but protecting pluralism in no way demands opening ourselves to some idea of the necessity of “secular” politics, (its many manifestations are world views in their own right) which will simply introduce its own versions of the public good and the proper domain of the state. So when you say, “given our growing pluralism and the de-sacralization of public discourse I'm not sure we can make such claims with any kind of valid authority for all Americans,” I respond by saying that claims of authority must be made because politics involves decision-making. Now, if you are “descriptively” stating that Christians will likely face growing obstacles to making authoritative, Christian claims in the public square for the foreseeable future, I agree with you, but if you are “normatively” asserting that Christians should not make authoritative, Christian claims in the public square because of grown pluralism, I adamantly dissent.
Lastly, I think Christianity is true, independent of whether anyone acknowledges Christ as Lord. So arguing the fact of pluralism (e.g., “the Biblical account is just one of many ‘world views’”) is not an argument for what’s true nor an argument for what should be authoritative in the political sphere.
Many thanks again,
Nathan
John,
You write: “In point of fact, the Biblical account is just one of many "world views" that attempt to describe the world ‘as it is.’”
And later you write: “given our growing pluralism and the de-sacralization of public discourse I'm not sure we can make such claims with any kind of valid authority for all Americans.”
The essence of your response cuts right to the heart of the dilemma of our age, politically and otherwise. How could I have the audacity to: (1) make a claim about the distinctiveness of marriage in relation to same-sex union, (2) assert that the distinction is at least in part based in a particular view of the created order (a concept, as you suggest, that is unintelligible to so many), and (3) further claim that marriage ought to receive special legal recognition and support because it is somehow integral to the public good in a way that other interpersonal relationships are not. And then I emphasize that the proper jurisdiction and competence of the state is to engage in those activities pertaining to the public good and not other goods, goods which may be important, but are either within the jurisdiction of other “institutions” (e.g., families, businesses, schools, universities, charities, trade unions, neighborhood associations, churches, mosques, friendships, and many others) or of individual persons. Critical to my argument is that the state ought only to be involved in those activities/enterprises/initiatives that pertain to public goods in order to advance public justice.
Please note, unless the political community (citizens in relation to government) is a comprehensive and all-consuming community then a distinction between those goods that are public, and within the domain of the state, and those things which are the domain of other, non-governmental spheres of life, must be made. As James Skillen has said and written in various ways, one of the most critical tasks of government is properly defining those areas of life which are non-governmental. If government fails to do this well, it risks introducing its coercive apparatus into spheres of life where non-coercive instruments and norms ought to be fully operative. To illustrate, if people in a given country were somehow coerced to be Christians, the Church could not rightly be said to be growing in number because a critical aspect of the religious sphere of life is that it is entered into without coercion. The same could be said of a friendship; coercion cannot operate within its bounds because neither the one coercing nor the coerced could rightly be said to be engaged in the free-giving, reciprocal exchanges of friendship.
All this is to say, discerning what constitutes the “public good” from other, non-public goods is an absolutely inevitable aspect of political deliberation, unless, of course, one is arguing for totalitarianism, which makes all areas of life the domain of the political community. One of the central elements of Dooyeweerd’s (and Skillen’s and Christian reformed thinking from Calvin through Kuyper to the present) and Catholic social teaching is different (but at times parallel) ways, is an attempt to discern the proper jurisdiction and competence of the state in order to offer a normative account of principled pluralism. Surely some things must be crimes investigated/prosecuted by the state, some things must be promoted by the state, some things must be coordinated by the state, some disputes must be adjudicated by the state, and so on. Discerning the proper contours/limits of these things is the essence of public justice, the task of advancing the public good. To illustrate, government should not tell parents how to love and respect their children but may justly prohibit physical abuse visited by parents upon their children and intervene by force if necessary to stop it.
This task of discerning the boundaries of the public good quickly takes us into worldview-level questions. So when you say, “the Biblical account is just one of many "world views" that attempt to describe the world ‘as it is,’” I respectfully say that you haven’t gotten us very far with respect to helping us figure out how to live peaceably in a pluralistic society. People like James Skillen, I think, would say the Christian view of things seeks to robustly protect pluralism, but protecting pluralism in no way demands opening ourselves to some idea of the necessity of “secular” politics, (its many manifestations are world views in their own right) which will simply introduce its own versions of the public good and the proper domain of the state. So when you say, “given our growing pluralism and the de-sacralization of public discourse I'm not sure we can make such claims with any kind of valid authority for all Americans,” I respond by saying that claims of authority must be made because politics involves decision-making. Now, if you are “descriptively” stating that Christians will likely face growing obstacles to making authoritative, Christian claims in the public square for the foreseeable future, I agree with you, but if you are “normatively” asserting that Christians should not make authoritative, Christian claims in the public square because of grown pluralism, I adamantly dissent.
Lastly, I think Christianity is true, independent of whether anyone acknowledges Christ as Lord. So arguing the fact of pluralism (e.g., “the Biblical account is just one of many ‘world views’”) is not an argument for what’s true nor an argument for what should be authoritative in the political sphere.
Many thanks again,
Nathan
John,
You write: “In point of fact, the Biblical account is just one of many "world views" that attempt to describe the world ‘as it is.’”
And later you write: “given our growing pluralism and the de-sacralization of public discourse I'm not sure we can make such claims with any kind of valid authority for all Americans.”
The essence of your response cuts right to the heart of the dilemma of our age, politically and otherwise. How could I have the audacity to: (1) make a claim about the distinctiveness of marriage in relation to same-sex union, (2) assert that the distinction is at least in part based in a particular view of the created order (a concept, as you suggest, that is unintelligible to so many), and (3) further claim that marriage ought to receive special legal recognition and support because it is somehow integral to the public good in a way that other interpersonal relationships are not. And then I emphasize that the proper jurisdiction and competence of the state is to engage in those activities pertaining to the public good and not other goods, goods which may be important, but are either within the jurisdiction of other “institutions” (e.g., families, businesses, schools, universities, charities, trade unions, neighborhood associations, churches, mosques, friendships, and many others) or of individual persons. Critical to my argument is that the state ought only to be involved in those activities/enterprises/initiatives that pertain to public goods in order to advance public justice.
Please note, unless the political community (citizens in relation to government) is a comprehensive and all-consuming community then a distinction between those goods that are public, and within the domain of the state, and those things which are the domain of other, non-governmental spheres of life, must be made. As James Skillen has said and written in various ways, one of the most critical tasks of government is properly defining those areas of life which are non-governmental. If government fails to do this well, it risks introducing its coercive apparatus into spheres of life where non-coercive instruments and norms ought to be fully operative. To illustrate, if people in a given country were somehow coerced to be Christians, the Church could not rightly be said to be growing in number because a critical aspect of the religious sphere of life is that it is entered into without coercion. The same could be said of a friendship; coercion cannot operate within its bounds because neither the one coercing nor the coerced could rightly be said to be engaged in the free-giving, reciprocal exchanges of friendship.
All this is to say, discerning what constitutes the “public good” from other, non-public goods is an absolutely inevitable aspect of political deliberation, unless, of course, one is arguing for totalitarianism, which makes all areas of life the domain of the political community. One of the central elements of Dooyeweerd’s (and Skillen’s and Christian reformed thinking from Calvin through Kuyper to the present) and Catholic social teaching is different (but at times parallel) ways, is an attempt to discern the proper jurisdiction and competence of the state in order to offer a normative account of principled pluralism. Surely some things must be crimes investigated/prosecuted by the state, some things must be promoted by the state, some things must be coordinated by the state, some disputes must be adjudicated by the state, and so on. Discerning the proper contours/limits of these things is the essence of public justice, the task of advancing the public good. To illustrate, government should not tell parents how to love and respect their children but may justly prohibit physical abuse visited by parents upon their children and intervene by force if necessary to stop it.
This task of discerning the boundaries of the public good quickly takes us into worldview-level questions. So when you say, “the Biblical account is just one of many "world views" that attempt to describe the world ‘as it is,’” I respectfully say that you haven’t gotten us very far with respect to helping us figure out how to live peaceably in a pluralistic society. People like James Skillen, I think, would say the Christian view of things seeks to robustly protect pluralism, but protecting pluralism in no way demands opening ourselves to some idea of the necessity of “secular” politics, (its many manifestations are world views in their own right) which will simply introduce its own versions of the public good and the proper domain of the state. So when you say, “given our growing pluralism and the de-sacralization of public discourse I'm not sure we can make such claims with any kind of valid authority for all Americans,” I respond by saying that claims of authority must be made because politics involves decision-making. Now, if you are “descriptively” stating that Christians will likely face growing obstacles to making authoritative, Christian claims in the public square for the foreseeable future, I agree with you, but if you are “normatively” asserting that Christians should not make authoritative, Christian claims in the public square because of grown pluralism, I adamantly dissent.
Lastly, I think Christianity is true, independent of whether anyone acknowledges Christ as Lord. So arguing the fact of pluralism (e.g., “the Biblical account is just one of many ‘world views’”) is not an argument for what’s true nor an argument for what should be authoritative in the political sphere.
Many thanks again,
Nathan
The public good in the union of a husband and a wife has been on display since creation–since Adam and Eve. Having two Adams or two Eves would have logically signaled the end of the story. Only the union of a husband and a wife qualify to be called "marriage." Same sex may be called "union" but not "marriage."
It is interesting to note that developing societies never think or talk about the issue of same sex union. They have more urgent concerns. Prosperous societies, on the other hand, have the luxury of facing problems such as same sex union.
My question is: in same sex union, where would the children come from??? Certainly procreation is only available through a husband/wife marriage. That is public good, and this is the normal. Abnormal union between same sex couples may be granted, but to call it marriage" defies all logic and history let alone religion.
Dr. Bishara:
Just to be clear, I am for the most part in agreement with your sentiments. The questions I am raising are not meant to throw into question the traditional Christian perspective on this issue as much as it is to note that in a pluralistic society such as ours biblical revelation is not the criteria that is used to determine "public good." We may wish that it were so, but the very nature of a determination on the part of those who framed our constitution to base a society on religious neutrality (at least in terms of privileging one set of scripturally determined assumptions over another) means that basing legal decisions on the Genesis creation account is not going to fly.
Here, too, it needs to be noted that the discussion about what scripture itself determines about same sex unions, or even the place of homosexuality in God's creation, is part of a lively debate happening among Christians. We don't, in other words, speak with one voice even in our own community, which makes it even more difficult to build a specifically "Christian" case on one side of this issue.
Dr. Bishara:
Just to be clear, I am for the most part in agreement with your sentiments. The questions I am raising are not meant to throw into question the traditional Christian perspective on this issue as much as it is to note that in a pluralistic society such as ours biblical revelation is not the criteria that is used to determine "public good." We may wish that it were so, but the very nature of a determination on the part of those who framed our constitution to base a society on religious neutrality (at least in terms of privileging one set of scripturally determined assumptions over another) means that basing legal decisions on the Genesis creation account is not going to fly.
Here, too, it needs to be noted that the discussion about what scripture itself determines about same sex unions, or even the place of homosexuality in God's creation, is part of a lively debate happening among Christians. We don't, in other words, speak with one voice even in our own community, which makes it even more difficult to build a specifically "Christian" case on one side of this issue.
Dr. Bishara:
Just to be clear, I am for the most part in agreement with your sentiments. The questions I am raising are not meant to throw into question the traditional Christian perspective on this issue as much as it is to note that in a pluralistic society such as ours biblical revelation is not the criteria that is used to determine "public good." We may wish that it were so, but the very nature of a determination on the part of those who framed our constitution to base a society on religious neutrality (at least in terms of privileging one set of scripturally determined assumptions over another) means that basing legal decisions on the Genesis creation account is not going to fly.
Here, too, it needs to be noted that the discussion about what scripture itself determines about same sex unions, or even the place of homosexuality in God's creation, is part of a lively debate happening among Christians. We don't, in other words, speak with one voice even in our own community, which makes it even more difficult to build a specifically "Christian" case on one side of this issue.
Let me thank Nathan and John for their helpful and important discussion. Both raise some important points, but I’ve found particularly helpful Nathan’s June 15 review of his presuppositions upon which he depends when enters into this discussion. As I share many of these presuppositions—though I'm perhaps a little more cautious on natural law—this helps me see the different ways that we might move from presupposition to principle to policy.
My sense is that in the political space we—and everyone—should be careful about trying to argue on the basis of our “limited common reason,” or even on “common sense”. So I share some of John’s concerns there. Far better to begin with the worldview, and likewise acknowledge that those we meet in politics will have different worldviews and see the issues differently. But the fact that we—all of us—find ourselves in these worldview narratives does not imply that we cannot communicate to each other out of those narratives. So here perhaps I find myself agreeing with Nathan. I’d add, however, that in politics I don’t believe we need to find a foundation for our agreement in some shared something (reason, or common sense, or “self-evident truths”). Rather we simply come to an agreement on an issue, even if we don’t agree on the reasons we come to that agreement.
In his most recent post, Nathan makes some additional helpful comments concerning the difficult question of discerning the public good from other non-public goods, and correctly notes that this is itself a worldview question. This makes sense to me: as we attempt to answer such questions, we can’t help at least implying our own worldview. While, as Nathan notes, this may not bring one popularity in certain social situations, I’m not particularly troubled by that. Indeed, in my original contribution, I suggested that defining what is and what is not a “marriage” may not be a necessary task of the state—in this, I think I follow Skillen’s suggestion cited by Nathan about discerning public from non-public goods. But no doubt, I’m depending on a particular worldview-based account of the nature and task of the state.
Thank you both for a thought-provoking interchange!
Paul: Thanks for your comments (not posted here yet I see), as it leads me to ponder whether or not the very institution of marriage has moved us into a thorny holdover from the days when "religious pluralism" meant affirming an essentially Christian worldview while acknowledging that within that larger framework exists a certain Christian diversity. At issue here is whether or not this paradigm continues to make sense – i.e. – having the secular state define marriage according to what is essentially a Christian construct. Plurality today means not just plurality within a general Christian framework (or as some would put it a "Judeo-Christian framework), but genuine religious or non-religious plurality. Can we, in other words, continue to assume that our nation will define the institution of marriage according to our criteria? Are we not, in fact, moving towards a situation where a clean break is made between civil and religious marriage, "civil" being defined according to criteria which may include same sex unions, while religious groups exclude them.
Interestingly, this is the paradigm that the Muslim empires used for centuries – empowering each religious community to determine its own "family law" using its own court systems, while working within the framework of Ottoman or Abbasid civil law. Thus Muslims would be allowed multiple partners while Christians and Jews weren't – both sanctioned by the state.
Something worth considering?
Paul: Thanks for your comments (not posted here yet I see), as it leads me to ponder whether or not the very institution of marriage has moved us into a thorny holdover from the days when "religious pluralism" meant affirming an essentially Christian worldview while acknowledging that within that larger framework exists a certain Christian diversity. At issue here is whether or not this paradigm continues to make sense – i.e. – having the secular state define marriage according to what is essentially a Christian construct. Plurality today means not just plurality within a general Christian framework (or as some would put it a "Judeo-Christian framework), but genuine religious or non-religious plurality. Can we, in other words, continue to assume that our nation will define the institution of marriage according to our criteria? Are we not, in fact, moving towards a situation where a clean break is made between civil and religious marriage, "civil" being defined according to criteria which may include same sex unions, while religious groups exclude them.
Interestingly, this is the paradigm that the Muslim empires used for centuries – empowering each religious community to determine its own "family law" using its own court systems, while working within the framework of Ottoman or Abbasid civil law. Thus Muslims would be allowed multiple partners while Christians and Jews weren't – both sanctioned by the state.
Something worth considering?
Paul: Thanks for your comments (not posted here yet I see), as it leads me to ponder whether or not the very institution of marriage has moved us into a thorny holdover from the days when "religious pluralism" meant affirming an essentially Christian worldview while acknowledging that within that larger framework exists a certain Christian diversity. At issue here is whether or not this paradigm continues to make sense – i.e. – having the secular state define marriage according to what is essentially a Christian construct. Plurality today means not just plurality within a general Christian framework (or as some would put it a "Judeo-Christian framework), but genuine religious or non-religious plurality. Can we, in other words, continue to assume that our nation will define the institution of marriage according to our criteria? Are we not, in fact, moving towards a situation where a clean break is made between civil and religious marriage, "civil" being defined according to criteria which may include same sex unions, while religious groups exclude them.
Interestingly, this is the paradigm that the Muslim empires used for centuries – empowering each religious community to determine its own "family law" using its own court systems, while working within the framework of Ottoman or Abbasid civil law. Thus Muslims would be allowed multiple partners while Christians and Jews weren't – both sanctioned by the state.
Something worth considering?
At least in the west, the reason that the state has recognized marriage is that marriage facilitates the raising of the next generation of citizens in an environment where social pathologies are minimized. Given the adverse impact the State has had on marriage and families since the 1960s, it is tempting to advocate John and Paul’s position of removing the State’s role in defining marriage. However, this may mean that policies that negatively affect families with children cannot be offset by other policies positively affecting the same.
Raising children is already dis-incentivized economically and culturally. Other public policy changes that tilt the incentives away from a sound family structure will further erode the number of children who will grow up to be virtuous citizens. Without a sufficient number of virtuous citizens we cannot have a republic.
At least in the west, the reason that the state has recognized marriage is that marriage facilitates the raising of the next generation of citizens in an environment where social pathologies are minimized. Given the adverse impact the State has had on marriage and families since the 1960s, it is tempting to advocate John and Paul’s position of removing the State’s role in defining marriage. However, this may mean that policies that negatively affect families with children cannot be offset by other policies positively affecting the same.
Raising children is already dis-incentivized economically and culturally. Other public policy changes that tilt the incentives away from a sound family structure will further erode the number of children who will grow up to be virtuous citizens. Without a sufficient number of virtuous citizens we cannot have a republic.
At least in the west, the reason that the state has recognized marriage is that marriage facilitates the raising of the next generation of citizens in an environment where social pathologies are minimized. Given the adverse impact the State has had on marriage and families since the 1960s, it is tempting to advocate John and Paul’s position of removing the State’s role in defining marriage. However, this may mean that policies that negatively affect families with children cannot be offset by other policies positively affecting the same.
Raising children is already dis-incentivized economically and culturally. Other public policy changes that tilt the incentives away from a sound family structure will further erode the number of children who will grow up to be virtuous citizens. Without a sufficient number of virtuous citizens we cannot have a republic.
When my wife and I were married (in Ontario, Canada), we were married by marriage banns. We did not obtain a marriage license from the province; rather, in each of our home congregations, a statement was printed in the church bulletin and read from the pulpit on three successive Sundays, indicating our names and the wedding date and asking those with objections to talk to the pastor. (As far as we know, there were no objections!) The point of the banns process, as I understand it, derives from canon law: to enable anyone to raise any legal impediment to the marriage (the existence of another spouse, for example).
At the time,I didn’t think very long about banns vs. licenses. But today I rather like the fact that we never had to approach the province for a “license to marry”. Rather, government was concerned only as far its responsibilities lay: supporting stable relationships and protecting the parties in these relationships.
I wonder if there’s a model here. My view is that the state should be slow to take upon itself the task of defining the nature of other institutions in society, and that it should be particularly careful when such institutions actually predate the state itself. Entities such as marriages or schools or even political parties are not creatures of the state. They are founded by people or groups of people who come together in various ways and for particular purposes, often without regard to actions of the state—and even sometimes *despite* what the state thinks. For the state to take upon itself the task of establishing or “defining” all these is a bad idea.
So for me it’s less whether the state *should* redefine marriage, or *how* it should do so, but rather, whether it has the *ability* to do so. Given the request (to my mind, a reasonable request) that the state recognize other sorts of relationships as well, and given the obvious disagreement within society on what marriage means, it seems to me that we ought to consider disestablishing any particular religious view of marriage, so long as such disestablishment is accompanied by an expansive degree of religious freedom for other social structures to understand marriage in their own way.
Note that doing so does not necessarily imply any particular view of marriage—it implies rather a particular view of the state and its role with respect to confessional pluralism; namely that it is inappropriate for religious groups (or anyone else) to use the power of the state to advance their own religious views. Can we do for marriage what we’ve done for religious establishments more generally?
Hi, Tom,
Good to hear your voice, neighbor.
A couple of questions related to your post:
1) Not sure what you mean by this: "policies that negatively affect families with children cannot be offset by other policies positively affecting the same." Does this mean that allowing same sex marriages would in some fashion negatively affect the relationships found within more traditional marriages, that somehow my relationship with my wife and children will be less fulfilling because same sex couples are being given this right? How is this so?
2) How will the sanctioning of same sex marriages negatively affect our ability to raise up "virtuous citizens?" In this case you need to be more precise in defining what you mean by "virtuous citizens" as it seems to suggest that children being raised by single parents or same sex partners are unable to meet this requirement – that children raised this way will become
"un-virtuous, " or possibly even threats to a functioning democracy. From what I observe the structure of a family unit has less to do with this than how those who are entrusted with raising their children handle the task. In this case traditional marriages do not necessary have a better track record , as there are plenty of un-virtuous citizens who have come out of such unions. The recent revelations coming out of the trial of the Penn State coach should disabuse us of any notion that traditional marriages provide what is necessary to raise children as they should be raised.
Finally – is it really the business of a secular state to even begin to define what makes for a "virtuous" citizen, other than making sure he or she doesn't break the law? This kind of terminology seems well outside the boundaries of state supervision. How could they even begin to give a definition for this term?
Hi, Tom,
Good to hear your voice, neighbor.
A couple of questions related to your post:
1) Not sure what you mean by this: "policies that negatively affect families with children cannot be offset by other policies positively affecting the same." Does this mean that allowing same sex marriages would in some fashion negatively affect the relationships found within more traditional marriages, that somehow my relationship with my wife and children will be less fulfilling because same sex couples are being given this right? How is this so?
2) How will the sanctioning of same sex marriages negatively affect our ability to raise up "virtuous citizens?" In this case you need to be more precise in defining what you mean by "virtuous citizens" as it seems to suggest that children being raised by single parents or same sex partners are unable to meet this requirement – that children raised this way will become
"un-virtuous, " or possibly even threats to a functioning democracy. From what I observe the structure of a family unit has less to do with this than how those who are entrusted with raising their children handle the task. In this case traditional marriages do not necessary have a better track record , as there are plenty of un-virtuous citizens who have come out of such unions. The recent revelations coming out of the trial of the Penn State coach should disabuse us of any notion that traditional marriages provide what is necessary to raise children as they should be raised.
Finally – is it really the business of a secular state to even begin to define what makes for a "virtuous" citizen, other than making sure he or she doesn't break the law? This kind of terminology seems well outside the boundaries of state supervision. How could they even begin to give a definition for this term?
Hi, Tom,
Good to hear your voice, neighbor.
A couple of questions related to your post:
1) Not sure what you mean by this: "policies that negatively affect families with children cannot be offset by other policies positively affecting the same." Does this mean that allowing same sex marriages would in some fashion negatively affect the relationships found within more traditional marriages, that somehow my relationship with my wife and children will be less fulfilling because same sex couples are being given this right? How is this so?
2) How will the sanctioning of same sex marriages negatively affect our ability to raise up "virtuous citizens?" In this case you need to be more precise in defining what you mean by "virtuous citizens" as it seems to suggest that children being raised by single parents or same sex partners are unable to meet this requirement – that children raised this way will become
"un-virtuous, " or possibly even threats to a functioning democracy. From what I observe the structure of a family unit has less to do with this than how those who are entrusted with raising their children handle the task. In this case traditional marriages do not necessary have a better track record , as there are plenty of un-virtuous citizens who have come out of such unions. The recent revelations coming out of the trial of the Penn State coach should disabuse us of any notion that traditional marriages provide what is necessary to raise children as they should be raised.
Finally – is it really the business of a secular state to even begin to define what makes for a "virtuous" citizen, other than making sure he or she doesn't break the law? This kind of terminology seems well outside the boundaries of state supervision. How could they even begin to give a definition for this term?
This comment responds to Paul Brink's June 23 post:
Paul,
You and the others are truly challenging me to grapple with this issue, and the related themes, at a deeper level than I have in the past, for which I’m very grateful. But as compelling as your proposal is, I still have some fundamental questions to ask (unless I’m misunderstanding you, which is possible).
You wrote: “My view is that the state should be slow to take upon itself the task of defining the nature of other institutions in society….”
I think this is one of the most fundamental tasks of the state. I don’t mean that the state is somehow responsible for declaring to other institutions what they actually are, but it is responsible for properly recognizing what they actually are in order to decider whether and how they should be treated by the state and potentially protected from the encroachment of other institutions. For instance, the state should distinguish between a non-profit, charity organization and a for-profit business. On the margins this may be a difficult task, but it is proper and just and when done well adds to human flourishing. At the most basic level, non-profits and businesses share many attributes, but they are different things and therefore hold at least the potential to be treated differently by the state.
You wrote: “ So for me it’s less whether the state *should* redefine marriage, or *how* it should do so, but rather, whether it has the *ability* to do so.”
The premise that the state is “defining” marriage under current federal law and many state laws that do not recognize same-sex marriage is, I think, a misnomer.
Many of us who advocate extending marriage law to the union of husband and wife alone are not really arguing for the state to "define" marriage; rather, we are arguing that the state should continue to extend marriage law only to the one institution that it was intended to support and that warrants consideration as a distinctly public good. If other interpersonal relationships somehow merit legal recognition and support, then debates about those relationships should unfold separately from debates about marriage law. Among other things, viewing the debate this way allows us to: (1) avoid the implication that the state creates or defines marriage; (2) more appropriately debate whether or in what ways the distinct attributes of same-sex union demand legal recognition and support of some kind; and (3) avoid the confusion (legal and moral) attached to the erroneous claim that marriage and same-sex union are the same "things." I tried to read a little about the practice of “marriage banns” in Canada and it appears that if a couple announces before the church their intention to be married and no valid protest is made then upon their marriage in the church, the provincial (and maybe national) government recognizes them as legally married. If a same-sex couple enters into the same process and is marriage in a church, they are extended the same legal recognition. And the virtue of this system is that the church (or another non-governmental institution) gets to recognize marriages as it sees fit. The question I come back to is whether non-marital, interpersonal relationships other than the union of husband and wife involve a public good that the state should recognize and act upon. Something like you described (marriage within a church and defined by that community) can be done in the U.S. today. Any same-sex couple that desires communion with an Episcopal parish, for example, and wants to be married in that parish can be married the same as any heterosexual couple could be. There are other Christian and non-Christian religious communities that would do the same. While I believe those Christian communities are in error when they do so, the practice is permitted. And for Christians who are married before the state and the church, we should certainly hold the sacramental and/or covenantal identity of our marriages at a level that our “licensed” marriages pale in comparison.
What I’m trying to establish is that I think the state does have the competence to define those tasks that involve public goods; even though if often messes up this task, it is the very nature of government to pursue it. I don’t want the state to “define” marriage. I want it to recognize that this interpersonal arrangement is of public consequence in a unique way. If other interpersonal arrangements are also of public consequence, then let the cases be made and the independent political deliberation unfold.
You wrote: “Given the request (to my mind, a reasonable request) that the state recognize other sorts of relationships as well, and given the obvious disagreement within society on what marriage means, it seems to me that we ought to consider disestablishing any particular religious view of marriage….”
I won’t reiterate much of what I’ve just written in the paragraph above since I think it pertains somewhat to this comment. I just want to add that just because a public law or policy is viewed as reflecting a “particular religious view” does not mean that it should be disestablished. The key question is whether a public law or policy, even if “religious”, intersects with the public good, the distinct domain of governmental responsibility. Some might argue that laws against polygamy are at root based in antiquated religious beliefs. I would assert that my views against polygamy are based on a religious worldview and that, unlike gossiping or hating someone in my heart, which I also find immoral based on a religious worldview, polygamy is detrimental to those involved, especially children, in a way that makes the practice a violation of public justice, thus a public “bad.” Therefore, polygamy warrants legal treatment and government action in a way that gossiping does not.
You wrote: “Can we do for marriage what we’ve done for religious establishments more generally?”
If the “we” here is the society of people residing within the territory of the U.S., then yes, and I think we already have. Same-sex couples can be married before a broad range of institutions occupying “space” in our society. But I question whether the full force of marriage law should be extended to non-marital relationships because they either don’t warrant it or they ought to be prohibited by law altogether (e.g., polygamy).
Many thanks for engaging us on this series of posts.
Nathan
This comment responds to Paul Brink's June 23 post:
Paul,
You and the others are truly challenging me to grapple with this issue, and the related themes, at a deeper level than I have in the past, for which I’m very grateful. But as compelling as your proposal is, I still have some fundamental questions to ask (unless I’m misunderstanding you, which is possible).
You wrote: “My view is that the state should be slow to take upon itself the task of defining the nature of other institutions in society….”
I think this is one of the most fundamental tasks of the state. I don’t mean that the state is somehow responsible for declaring to other institutions what they actually are, but it is responsible for properly recognizing what they actually are in order to decider whether and how they should be treated by the state and potentially protected from the encroachment of other institutions. For instance, the state should distinguish between a non-profit, charity organization and a for-profit business. On the margins this may be a difficult task, but it is proper and just and when done well adds to human flourishing. At the most basic level, non-profits and businesses share many attributes, but they are different things and therefore hold at least the potential to be treated differently by the state.
You wrote: “ So for me it’s less whether the state *should* redefine marriage, or *how* it should do so, but rather, whether it has the *ability* to do so.”
The premise that the state is “defining” marriage under current federal law and many state laws that do not recognize same-sex marriage is, I think, a misnomer.
Many of us who advocate extending marriage law to the union of husband and wife alone are not really arguing for the state to "define" marriage; rather, we are arguing that the state should continue to extend marriage law only to the one institution that it was intended to support and that warrants consideration as a distinctly public good. If other interpersonal relationships somehow merit legal recognition and support, then debates about those relationships should unfold separately from debates about marriage law. Among other things, viewing the debate this way allows us to: (1) avoid the implication that the state creates or defines marriage; (2) more appropriately debate whether or in what ways the distinct attributes of same-sex union demand legal recognition and support of some kind; and (3) avoid the confusion (legal and moral) attached to the erroneous claim that marriage and same-sex union are the same "things." I tried to read a little about the practice of “marriage banns” in Canada and it appears that if a couple announces before the church their intention to be married and no valid protest is made then upon their marriage in the church, the provincial (and maybe national) government recognizes them as legally married. If a same-sex couple enters into the same process and is marriage in a church, they are extended the same legal recognition. And the virtue of this system is that the church (or another non-governmental institution) gets to recognize marriages as it sees fit. The question I come back to is whether non-marital, interpersonal relationships other than the union of husband and wife involve a public good that the state should recognize and act upon. Something like you described (marriage within a church and defined by that community) can be done in the U.S. today. Any same-sex couple that desires communion with an Episcopal parish, for example, and wants to be married in that parish can be married the same as any heterosexual couple could be. There are other Christian and non-Christian religious communities that would do the same. While I believe those Christian communities are in error when they do so, the practice is permitted. And for Christians who are married before the state and the church, we should certainly hold the sacramental and/or covenantal identity of our marriages at a level that our “licensed” marriages pale in comparison.
What I’m trying to establish is that I think the state does have the competence to define those tasks that involve public goods; even though if often messes up this task, it is the very nature of government to pursue it. I don’t want the state to “define” marriage. I want it to recognize that this interpersonal arrangement is of public consequence in a unique way. If other interpersonal arrangements are also of public consequence, then let the cases be made and the independent political deliberation unfold.
You wrote: “Given the request (to my mind, a reasonable request) that the state recognize other sorts of relationships as well, and given the obvious disagreement within society on what marriage means, it seems to me that we ought to consider disestablishing any particular religious view of marriage….”
I won’t reiterate much of what I’ve just written in the paragraph above since I think it pertains somewhat to this comment. I just want to add that just because a public law or policy is viewed as reflecting a “particular religious view” does not mean that it should be disestablished. The key question is whether a public law or policy, even if “religious”, intersects with the public good, the distinct domain of governmental responsibility. Some might argue that laws against polygamy are at root based in antiquated religious beliefs. I would assert that my views against polygamy are based on a religious worldview and that, unlike gossiping or hating someone in my heart, which I also find immoral based on a religious worldview, polygamy is detrimental to those involved, especially children, in a way that makes the practice a violation of public justice, thus a public “bad.” Therefore, polygamy warrants legal treatment and government action in a way that gossiping does not.
You wrote: “Can we do for marriage what we’ve done for religious establishments more generally?”
If the “we” here is the society of people residing within the territory of the U.S., then yes, and I think we already have. Same-sex couples can be married before a broad range of institutions occupying “space” in our society. But I question whether the full force of marriage law should be extended to non-marital relationships because they either don’t warrant it or they ought to be prohibited by law altogether (e.g., polygamy).
Many thanks for engaging us on this series of posts.
Nathan
This comment responds to Paul Brink's June 23 post:
Paul,
You and the others are truly challenging me to grapple with this issue, and the related themes, at a deeper level than I have in the past, for which I’m very grateful. But as compelling as your proposal is, I still have some fundamental questions to ask (unless I’m misunderstanding you, which is possible).
You wrote: “My view is that the state should be slow to take upon itself the task of defining the nature of other institutions in society….”
I think this is one of the most fundamental tasks of the state. I don’t mean that the state is somehow responsible for declaring to other institutions what they actually are, but it is responsible for properly recognizing what they actually are in order to decider whether and how they should be treated by the state and potentially protected from the encroachment of other institutions. For instance, the state should distinguish between a non-profit, charity organization and a for-profit business. On the margins this may be a difficult task, but it is proper and just and when done well adds to human flourishing. At the most basic level, non-profits and businesses share many attributes, but they are different things and therefore hold at least the potential to be treated differently by the state.
You wrote: “ So for me it’s less whether the state *should* redefine marriage, or *how* it should do so, but rather, whether it has the *ability* to do so.”
The premise that the state is “defining” marriage under current federal law and many state laws that do not recognize same-sex marriage is, I think, a misnomer.
Many of us who advocate extending marriage law to the union of husband and wife alone are not really arguing for the state to "define" marriage; rather, we are arguing that the state should continue to extend marriage law only to the one institution that it was intended to support and that warrants consideration as a distinctly public good. If other interpersonal relationships somehow merit legal recognition and support, then debates about those relationships should unfold separately from debates about marriage law. Among other things, viewing the debate this way allows us to: (1) avoid the implication that the state creates or defines marriage; (2) more appropriately debate whether or in what ways the distinct attributes of same-sex union demand legal recognition and support of some kind; and (3) avoid the confusion (legal and moral) attached to the erroneous claim that marriage and same-sex union are the same "things." I tried to read a little about the practice of “marriage banns” in Canada and it appears that if a couple announces before the church their intention to be married and no valid protest is made then upon their marriage in the church, the provincial (and maybe national) government recognizes them as legally married. If a same-sex couple enters into the same process and is marriage in a church, they are extended the same legal recognition. And the virtue of this system is that the church (or another non-governmental institution) gets to recognize marriages as it sees fit. The question I come back to is whether non-marital, interpersonal relationships other than the union of husband and wife involve a public good that the state should recognize and act upon. Something like you described (marriage within a church and defined by that community) can be done in the U.S. today. Any same-sex couple that desires communion with an Episcopal parish, for example, and wants to be married in that parish can be married the same as any heterosexual couple could be. There are other Christian and non-Christian religious communities that would do the same. While I believe those Christian communities are in error when they do so, the practice is permitted. And for Christians who are married before the state and the church, we should certainly hold the sacramental and/or covenantal identity of our marriages at a level that our “licensed” marriages pale in comparison.
What I’m trying to establish is that I think the state does have the competence to define those tasks that involve public goods; even though if often messes up this task, it is the very nature of government to pursue it. I don’t want the state to “define” marriage. I want it to recognize that this interpersonal arrangement is of public consequence in a unique way. If other interpersonal arrangements are also of public consequence, then let the cases be made and the independent political deliberation unfold.
You wrote: “Given the request (to my mind, a reasonable request) that the state recognize other sorts of relationships as well, and given the obvious disagreement within society on what marriage means, it seems to me that we ought to consider disestablishing any particular religious view of marriage….”
I won’t reiterate much of what I’ve just written in the paragraph above since I think it pertains somewhat to this comment. I just want to add that just because a public law or policy is viewed as reflecting a “particular religious view” does not mean that it should be disestablished. The key question is whether a public law or policy, even if “religious”, intersects with the public good, the distinct domain of governmental responsibility. Some might argue that laws against polygamy are at root based in antiquated religious beliefs. I would assert that my views against polygamy are based on a religious worldview and that, unlike gossiping or hating someone in my heart, which I also find immoral based on a religious worldview, polygamy is detrimental to those involved, especially children, in a way that makes the practice a violation of public justice, thus a public “bad.” Therefore, polygamy warrants legal treatment and government action in a way that gossiping does not.
You wrote: “Can we do for marriage what we’ve done for religious establishments more generally?”
If the “we” here is the society of people residing within the territory of the U.S., then yes, and I think we already have. Same-sex couples can be married before a broad range of institutions occupying “space” in our society. But I question whether the full force of marriage law should be extended to non-marital relationships because they either don’t warrant it or they ought to be prohibited by law altogether (e.g., polygamy).
Many thanks for engaging us on this series of posts.
Nathan
To John & Tom:
Being the most junior of all three of us, I will wade into this discussion carefully. For Tom's Point #1, I echo in agreement. While granting marriage rights to same sex couples may not palpably decrease your marital satisfaction or do it directly, it could indirectly. I think this is especially so for Christian families, and less so for non-Christian families. Unless you believe in a Christian faith that defines marriage as just 2 people who are truly in love with each other, most orthodox Christian churches will probably be teaching something different. And when kids start reading Genesis and if they get to Leviticus, and then later to the separate admonitions by Jesus and Paul against marital infidelity and other forms of sexual immorality, a child/youth going to church may ask why are we Christians supporting someting that the Bible clearly is against?
That is one source of marriage difficulty. Not directly, but indirectly, through inconsistency between what is in the Bible and how Christians live out their faith. No, sexuality issues is one of hundreds of ways that Christians are often in disobedience, but it is one of them.
About Point #2, I'll refrain from defining what "virtuous citizen" is, but the Penn State tragedy / travesty IS a condemnation against, BAD marriage, not marriage. Seeing Christians behaving badly, don't make me feel bad about Christ, but His "followers". Even if that marriage was bad, Sandusky did a triple-whammy – extra-marital sex, by force, with underage boys. How many human, societal, and Biblical laws can one man break? He broke them all.
How would the LGBTQ community view his actions? I'm sure with revulsion as well. For them though, it'll be focused on the illegality of the relations, the age of the victims, and the nonconsensual nature, not on the sexual relations per se. For them, again, one heinous act by a sick man (from any perspective) still would not defile their belief in the legitimacy of same sex relations.
My two cents, I'll duck now…
To John & Tom:
Being the most junior of all three of us, I will wade into this discussion carefully. For Tom's Point #1, I echo in agreement. While granting marriage rights to same sex couples may not palpably decrease your marital satisfaction or do it directly, it could indirectly. I think this is especially so for Christian families, and less so for non-Christian families. Unless you believe in a Christian faith that defines marriage as just 2 people who are truly in love with each other, most orthodox Christian churches will probably be teaching something different. And when kids start reading Genesis and if they get to Leviticus, and then later to the separate admonitions by Jesus and Paul against marital infidelity and other forms of sexual immorality, a child/youth going to church may ask why are we Christians supporting someting that the Bible clearly is against?
That is one source of marriage difficulty. Not directly, but indirectly, through inconsistency between what is in the Bible and how Christians live out their faith. No, sexuality issues is one of hundreds of ways that Christians are often in disobedience, but it is one of them.
About Point #2, I'll refrain from defining what "virtuous citizen" is, but the Penn State tragedy / travesty IS a condemnation against, BAD marriage, not marriage. Seeing Christians behaving badly, don't make me feel bad about Christ, but His "followers". Even if that marriage was bad, Sandusky did a triple-whammy – extra-marital sex, by force, with underage boys. How many human, societal, and Biblical laws can one man break? He broke them all.
How would the LGBTQ community view his actions? I'm sure with revulsion as well. For them though, it'll be focused on the illegality of the relations, the age of the victims, and the nonconsensual nature, not on the sexual relations per se. For them, again, one heinous act by a sick man (from any perspective) still would not defile their belief in the legitimacy of same sex relations.
My two cents, I'll duck now…
To John & Tom:
Being the most junior of all three of us, I will wade into this discussion carefully. For Tom's Point #1, I echo in agreement. While granting marriage rights to same sex couples may not palpably decrease your marital satisfaction or do it directly, it could indirectly. I think this is especially so for Christian families, and less so for non-Christian families. Unless you believe in a Christian faith that defines marriage as just 2 people who are truly in love with each other, most orthodox Christian churches will probably be teaching something different. And when kids start reading Genesis and if they get to Leviticus, and then later to the separate admonitions by Jesus and Paul against marital infidelity and other forms of sexual immorality, a child/youth going to church may ask why are we Christians supporting someting that the Bible clearly is against?
That is one source of marriage difficulty. Not directly, but indirectly, through inconsistency between what is in the Bible and how Christians live out their faith. No, sexuality issues is one of hundreds of ways that Christians are often in disobedience, but it is one of them.
About Point #2, I'll refrain from defining what "virtuous citizen" is, but the Penn State tragedy / travesty IS a condemnation against, BAD marriage, not marriage. Seeing Christians behaving badly, don't make me feel bad about Christ, but His "followers". Even if that marriage was bad, Sandusky did a triple-whammy – extra-marital sex, by force, with underage boys. How many human, societal, and Biblical laws can one man break? He broke them all.
How would the LGBTQ community view his actions? I'm sure with revulsion as well. For them though, it'll be focused on the illegality of the relations, the age of the victims, and the nonconsensual nature, not on the sexual relations per se. For them, again, one heinous act by a sick man (from any perspective) still would not defile their belief in the legitimacy of same sex relations.
My two cents, I'll duck now…
Hi John,
Let me see if I can answer your questions.
First I would echo what Terry mentioned regarding indirection. E.g. a doubling of the crime rate in American urban centers might not be considered a direct concern of those of us in the hinterlands, but it will affect everyone at least indirectly by way of more frequent injustice to victims, higher taxes, greater restrictions due to increased security, reduced participation in civil institutions, etc. Additionally, as Nathan pointed out, same-sex marriage (SSM) is already available for same sex couples. The issue is not whether same-sex couples can marry, because same-sex couples can marry already. The question is whether the State will define SSM as equivalent to traditional heterosexual marriage.
The best argument in favor of governmental recognition of the equivalence of same-sex marriage is that SSM couples can, or would, raise children in a stable, low-conflict, loving home where those children become productive citizens. I think that this is a possibility. If true, it would be in the State’s interest to validate SSM because of the reasons I mentioned before. Early research indicated that SSM-raised children did no worse than children raised by their biological parents. Recent research shows that those early results are methodologically flawed. (See Loren Marks, of LSU, in Social Science Research). Mark Regnerus of UT at Austin published a study with an improved methodology compared to prior work. Regnerus found significant differences in outcomes between same-sex couples and traditional couples. Both papers are at Science Direct.
The difficulty is that relying on research is problematic. It will take decades to know the impact of government sanctioned SSM on children. Moreover, no one has offered a plausible mechanism that endorses SSM while prohibiting, e.g., polygamy. We need no studies to know that polygamy will necessitate that a majority of young men must be driven from their polygamy-practicing home towns. The arithmetic of polygamy ensures that outcome. We have already seen this happen in those Mormon communities that continue to practice polygamy. America does not need young men needlessly alienated and young women socialized into dysfunctional relationships.
It ought to be incumbent upon policy makers to follow the adage ‘first, do no harm.’
As to virtue, recall from Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws) that governments can be divided into despotisms, monarchies and democracies. Monarchies depend on honor, despotisms on fear, and democracies on virtue. The United States was founded on the presumption of a virtuous citizenry (see Daniel N. Robinson’s Teaching Company course, American Ideals: Founding a ‘Republic of Virtue’). We can neither enact enough laws nor hire enough police to ensure the safety of the citizenry in a democracy bereft of virtue.
I realize that using ‘virtue’ is unpopular with some segments of our fellow citizens. I would be surprised if you are one of them. It is puzzling to me that they seem to believe that without the virtues of prudence, honesty, kindness, restraint, trustworthiness, helpfulness, fortitude, generosity and justice we can have a working democracy. When it comes to behavior, the external tethers of the law are a poor substitute for the conscience of a virtuous citizen. Note that our schools can, and ought to, teach civic virtue, but this does not mean that the government must define civic virtue. Virtue is a function of culture, and deficiencies in our politics are results of a cultural failure.
Hi John,
Let me see if I can answer your questions.
First I would echo what Terry mentioned regarding indirection. E.g. a doubling of the crime rate in American urban centers might not be considered a direct concern of those of us in the hinterlands, but it will affect everyone at least indirectly by way of more frequent injustice to victims, higher taxes, greater restrictions due to increased security, reduced participation in civil institutions, etc. Additionally, as Nathan pointed out, same-sex marriage (SSM) is already available for same sex couples. The issue is not whether same-sex couples can marry, because same-sex couples can marry already. The question is whether the State will define SSM as equivalent to traditional heterosexual marriage.
The best argument in favor of governmental recognition of the equivalence of same-sex marriage is that SSM couples can, or would, raise children in a stable, low-conflict, loving home where those children become productive citizens. I think that this is a possibility. If true, it would be in the State’s interest to validate SSM because of the reasons I mentioned before. Early research indicated that SSM-raised children did no worse than children raised by their biological parents. Recent research shows that those early results are methodologically flawed. (See Loren Marks, of LSU, in Social Science Research). Mark Regnerus of UT at Austin published a study with an improved methodology compared to prior work. Regnerus found significant differences in outcomes between same-sex couples and traditional couples. Both papers are at Science Direct.
The difficulty is that relying on research is problematic. It will take decades to know the impact of government sanctioned SSM on children. Moreover, no one has offered a plausible mechanism that endorses SSM while prohibiting, e.g., polygamy. We need no studies to know that polygamy will necessitate that a majority of young men must be driven from their polygamy-practicing home towns. The arithmetic of polygamy ensures that outcome. We have already seen this happen in those Mormon communities that continue to practice polygamy. America does not need young men needlessly alienated and young women socialized into dysfunctional relationships.
It ought to be incumbent upon policy makers to follow the adage ‘first, do no harm.’
As to virtue, recall from Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws) that governments can be divided into despotisms, monarchies and democracies. Monarchies depend on honor, despotisms on fear, and democracies on virtue. The United States was founded on the presumption of a virtuous citizenry (see Daniel N. Robinson’s Teaching Company course, American Ideals: Founding a ‘Republic of Virtue’). We can neither enact enough laws nor hire enough police to ensure the safety of the citizenry in a democracy bereft of virtue.
I realize that using ‘virtue’ is unpopular with some segments of our fellow citizens. I would be surprised if you are one of them. It is puzzling to me that they seem to believe that without the virtues of prudence, honesty, kindness, restraint, trustworthiness, helpfulness, fortitude, generosity and justice we can have a working democracy. When it comes to behavior, the external tethers of the law are a poor substitute for the conscience of a virtuous citizen. Note that our schools can, and ought to, teach civic virtue, but this does not mean that the government must define civic virtue. Virtue is a function of culture, and deficiencies in our politics are results of a cultural failure.
Hi John,
Let me see if I can answer your questions.
First I would echo what Terry mentioned regarding indirection. E.g. a doubling of the crime rate in American urban centers might not be considered a direct concern of those of us in the hinterlands, but it will affect everyone at least indirectly by way of more frequent injustice to victims, higher taxes, greater restrictions due to increased security, reduced participation in civil institutions, etc. Additionally, as Nathan pointed out, same-sex marriage (SSM) is already available for same sex couples. The issue is not whether same-sex couples can marry, because same-sex couples can marry already. The question is whether the State will define SSM as equivalent to traditional heterosexual marriage.
The best argument in favor of governmental recognition of the equivalence of same-sex marriage is that SSM couples can, or would, raise children in a stable, low-conflict, loving home where those children become productive citizens. I think that this is a possibility. If true, it would be in the State’s interest to validate SSM because of the reasons I mentioned before. Early research indicated that SSM-raised children did no worse than children raised by their biological parents. Recent research shows that those early results are methodologically flawed. (See Loren Marks, of LSU, in Social Science Research). Mark Regnerus of UT at Austin published a study with an improved methodology compared to prior work. Regnerus found significant differences in outcomes between same-sex couples and traditional couples. Both papers are at Science Direct.
The difficulty is that relying on research is problematic. It will take decades to know the impact of government sanctioned SSM on children. Moreover, no one has offered a plausible mechanism that endorses SSM while prohibiting, e.g., polygamy. We need no studies to know that polygamy will necessitate that a majority of young men must be driven from their polygamy-practicing home towns. The arithmetic of polygamy ensures that outcome. We have already seen this happen in those Mormon communities that continue to practice polygamy. America does not need young men needlessly alienated and young women socialized into dysfunctional relationships.
It ought to be incumbent upon policy makers to follow the adage ‘first, do no harm.’
As to virtue, recall from Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws) that governments can be divided into despotisms, monarchies and democracies. Monarchies depend on honor, despotisms on fear, and democracies on virtue. The United States was founded on the presumption of a virtuous citizenry (see Daniel N. Robinson’s Teaching Company course, American Ideals: Founding a ‘Republic of Virtue’). We can neither enact enough laws nor hire enough police to ensure the safety of the citizenry in a democracy bereft of virtue.
I realize that using ‘virtue’ is unpopular with some segments of our fellow citizens. I would be surprised if you are one of them. It is puzzling to me that they seem to believe that without the virtues of prudence, honesty, kindness, restraint, trustworthiness, helpfulness, fortitude, generosity and justice we can have a working democracy. When it comes to behavior, the external tethers of the law are a poor substitute for the conscience of a virtuous citizen. Note that our schools can, and ought to, teach civic virtue, but this does not mean that the government must define civic virtue. Virtue is a function of culture, and deficiencies in our politics are results of a cultural failure.
Quick one, Tom:
I find your reference to "virtuous citizenry" interesting as this is a primary motif of the early 19th century literature I am reading for my dissertation. What isn't said here is that those who were arguing for a "virtuous" citizenry were primary the New England Calvinists who were committed to creating something resembling a theocracy for America, with the leadership of the church (in this case the Calvinist branch of the church) defining what virtue is. They envisioned a country where clergy played a large role in ensuring that the moral fiber of the land was reflective of Christian values as they defined those values.
What's interesting about this is the push back they got not only from the rationalists led by Thomas Jefferson, who was committed to resisting Calvinist domination, but the Baptists who did the same. In the end Jefferson (who was the devil incarnate to the Calvinist clergy – an "atheist" who would destroy America's virtue by dint of his infidelity) and the Baptists won.
The point here is to say that once "virtue" becomes the guiding principle for determining legality, religious liberty is threatened, as those who claim the right to define "virtue" will almost certainly define it according to their own theological/philosophical standards leading to the marginalization of those who don't fit, which, in the case under review here, would mean same sex couples.
We had this for many years, as those who emphasized "virtue" as their guiding principle demanded that homosexual activity be criminalized. I'm hoping you aren't advocating a return to this model (as I know you aren't). But that, it seems to me, is the inevitable outcome of using "virtue" as legal guideline.
Quick one, Tom:
I find your reference to "virtuous citizenry" interesting as this is a primary motif of the early 19th century literature I am reading for my dissertation. What isn't said here is that those who were arguing for a "virtuous" citizenry were primary the New England Calvinists who were committed to creating something resembling a theocracy for America, with the leadership of the church (in this case the Calvinist branch of the church) defining what virtue is. They envisioned a country where clergy played a large role in ensuring that the moral fiber of the land was reflective of Christian values as they defined those values.
What's interesting about this is the push back they got not only from the rationalists led by Thomas Jefferson, who was committed to resisting Calvinist domination, but the Baptists who did the same. In the end Jefferson (who was the devil incarnate to the Calvinist clergy – an "atheist" who would destroy America's virtue by dint of his infidelity) and the Baptists won.
The point here is to say that once "virtue" becomes the guiding principle for determining legality, religious liberty is threatened, as those who claim the right to define "virtue" will almost certainly define it according to their own theological/philosophical standards leading to the marginalization of those who don't fit, which, in the case under review here, would mean same sex couples.
We had this for many years, as those who emphasized "virtue" as their guiding principle demanded that homosexual activity be criminalized. I'm hoping you aren't advocating a return to this model (as I know you aren't). But that, it seems to me, is the inevitable outcome of using "virtue" as legal guideline.
Quick one, Tom:
I find your reference to "virtuous citizenry" interesting as this is a primary motif of the early 19th century literature I am reading for my dissertation. What isn't said here is that those who were arguing for a "virtuous" citizenry were primary the New England Calvinists who were committed to creating something resembling a theocracy for America, with the leadership of the church (in this case the Calvinist branch of the church) defining what virtue is. They envisioned a country where clergy played a large role in ensuring that the moral fiber of the land was reflective of Christian values as they defined those values.
What's interesting about this is the push back they got not only from the rationalists led by Thomas Jefferson, who was committed to resisting Calvinist domination, but the Baptists who did the same. In the end Jefferson (who was the devil incarnate to the Calvinist clergy – an "atheist" who would destroy America's virtue by dint of his infidelity) and the Baptists won.
The point here is to say that once "virtue" becomes the guiding principle for determining legality, religious liberty is threatened, as those who claim the right to define "virtue" will almost certainly define it according to their own theological/philosophical standards leading to the marginalization of those who don't fit, which, in the case under review here, would mean same sex couples.
We had this for many years, as those who emphasized "virtue" as their guiding principle demanded that homosexual activity be criminalized. I'm hoping you aren't advocating a return to this model (as I know you aren't). But that, it seems to me, is the inevitable outcome of using "virtue" as legal guideline.
Hi John,
We owe a great debt to the Calvinists for American Independence. In George Bancroft’s History of the United States, he wrote, "The Revolution of 1776, so far as it was affected by religion, was a Presbyterian measure. It was the natural outgrowth of the principles which the Presbyterianism of the Old World planted in her sons, the English Puritans, the Scotch Covenanters, the French Huguenots, the Dutch Calvinists, and the Presbyterians of Ulster."
According to William P. Breed, a loyalist wrote
"Believe me, sir, the Presbyterians have been the chief and principal instruments in all these flaming measures; and they always do and ever will act against government from that restless and turbulent anti-monarchical spirit which has always distinguished them everywhere when they had, or by any means could assume, power, however illegally."
But I am surprised that your view seems to be that because some Calvinist clergy tried (and failed) to redefine virtue, we ought to discard civic virtue. (Or define virtue to include the criminalization of homosexual activity, for that matter.) As the Romans said “ab abusu ad usum non valet consequentia” or in English (Jon Stone), “the usefulness of something is not invalidated by the consequences of its abuse.” The cardinal virtues were recognized by Aristotle, who, as far as I know, was not a Calvinist. 🙂 I do not see why civic virtue inevitably leads to the extreme measure of criminalization of homosexual activity. That error only could occur through a failure of civic virtue, not as a result of it.
In The Federalist 55, James Madison wrote “As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another.”
You seem to be saying that there is no need of civic virtue. If Madison’s inference is correct we are left with “the chains of despotism.” Surely despotism and its destruction of liberty cannot be your preferred solution. But if we have no civic virtue, how can democracy work?
Hi John,
We owe a great debt to the Calvinists for American Independence. In George Bancroft’s History of the United States, he wrote, "The Revolution of 1776, so far as it was affected by religion, was a Presbyterian measure. It was the natural outgrowth of the principles which the Presbyterianism of the Old World planted in her sons, the English Puritans, the Scotch Covenanters, the French Huguenots, the Dutch Calvinists, and the Presbyterians of Ulster."
According to William P. Breed, a loyalist wrote
"Believe me, sir, the Presbyterians have been the chief and principal instruments in all these flaming measures; and they always do and ever will act against government from that restless and turbulent anti-monarchical spirit which has always distinguished them everywhere when they had, or by any means could assume, power, however illegally."
But I am surprised that your view seems to be that because some Calvinist clergy tried (and failed) to redefine virtue, we ought to discard civic virtue. (Or define virtue to include the criminalization of homosexual activity, for that matter.) As the Romans said “ab abusu ad usum non valet consequentia” or in English (Jon Stone), “the usefulness of something is not invalidated by the consequences of its abuse.” The cardinal virtues were recognized by Aristotle, who, as far as I know, was not a Calvinist. 🙂 I do not see why civic virtue inevitably leads to the extreme measure of criminalization of homosexual activity. That error only could occur through a failure of civic virtue, not as a result of it.
In The Federalist 55, James Madison wrote “As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another.”
You seem to be saying that there is no need of civic virtue. If Madison’s inference is correct we are left with “the chains of despotism.” Surely despotism and its destruction of liberty cannot be your preferred solution. But if we have no civic virtue, how can democracy work?
Hi John,
We owe a great debt to the Calvinists for American Independence. In George Bancroft’s History of the United States, he wrote, "The Revolution of 1776, so far as it was affected by religion, was a Presbyterian measure. It was the natural outgrowth of the principles which the Presbyterianism of the Old World planted in her sons, the English Puritans, the Scotch Covenanters, the French Huguenots, the Dutch Calvinists, and the Presbyterians of Ulster."
According to William P. Breed, a loyalist wrote
"Believe me, sir, the Presbyterians have been the chief and principal instruments in all these flaming measures; and they always do and ever will act against government from that restless and turbulent anti-monarchical spirit which has always distinguished them everywhere when they had, or by any means could assume, power, however illegally."
But I am surprised that your view seems to be that because some Calvinist clergy tried (and failed) to redefine virtue, we ought to discard civic virtue. (Or define virtue to include the criminalization of homosexual activity, for that matter.) As the Romans said “ab abusu ad usum non valet consequentia” or in English (Jon Stone), “the usefulness of something is not invalidated by the consequences of its abuse.” The cardinal virtues were recognized by Aristotle, who, as far as I know, was not a Calvinist. 🙂 I do not see why civic virtue inevitably leads to the extreme measure of criminalization of homosexual activity. That error only could occur through a failure of civic virtue, not as a result of it.
In The Federalist 55, James Madison wrote “As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another.”
You seem to be saying that there is no need of civic virtue. If Madison’s inference is correct we are left with “the chains of despotism.” Surely despotism and its destruction of liberty cannot be your preferred solution. But if we have no civic virtue, how can democracy work?
Tom,
Again I find it interesting and a bit archaic of you to be referring to Federalist and early Calvinist attitudes towards the role of virtue in a civil society. The Calvinists in this case were in league with the Federalists, as both worked to prevent the Jeffersonians, with their wild ideas about liberty and egalitarianism, from becoming a threat to a virtuous republic (which could, of course, not survive without a religiously Calvinist nanny).
A lot of people get nervous when Christians attempt to revive these earlier discussions about virtue, primarily because it is difficult to conceive how "virtue" can be defined apart from delegating that task to one particular religious perspective. My Rabbi friend from LA, Haim dov Beliak, gets especially nervous when he hears talk like this. He runs a website called Jews on First (jewsonfirst.org) which is dedicated to keeping the wall between church and state high and strong. It is his contention that when that gets weakened, the ones who suffer are those who are not allowed to be part of that conversation about "virtue."
Here's the problem as it relates to this present discussion: there are those (especially those who promote Federalism and early Calvinism as a model for American society) who would, in fact, promote the suppression of gay rights or the rights of Muslims or the rights of many other minorities in our egalitarian society, in the name of "virtue" as "virtue" in their case would be defined according to their understanding of biblical Christianity. That's what makes Rabbi Beliak nervous – as he fears that the real agenda of those who think this way is to impose a narrow vision of evangelical Christianity on our pluralistic society – an imposition that would inevitably lead to the marginalization of those who aren't allowed to be part of that discussion.
If, as you seem to suggest, a public discourse on virtue would be exactly that – a "public" discourse, allowing for all voices to enter into the conversation – then I can't see how there could be any consensus on homosexuality, as even in Christian circles the mere mention of this topic leads to not only strong disagreement, but divisions. Those who believe homosexuality is evil will say that a virtuous society cannot countenance same sex marriage. Those who believe it is a natural part of the created order would say that a virtuous society must countenance same sex marriage. So who gets to determine how "virtue" is defined?
That's my problem with using this terminology – not the idea of promoting "virtue", but using it as a means to determine how legislation and laws are formulated. I'm a Calvinist, but I recognize that America could not have survived to become the pluralistic state it is today (a pluralism I celebrate as someone who has lived in the narrower confines of a Muslim society) if the New England Calvinists had had their way.
Tom,
Again I find it interesting and a bit archaic of you to be referring to Federalist and early Calvinist attitudes towards the role of virtue in a civil society. The Calvinists in this case were in league with the Federalists, as both worked to prevent the Jeffersonians, with their wild ideas about liberty and egalitarianism, from becoming a threat to a virtuous republic (which could, of course, not survive without a religiously Calvinist nanny).
A lot of people get nervous when Christians attempt to revive these earlier discussions about virtue, primarily because it is difficult to conceive how "virtue" can be defined apart from delegating that task to one particular religious perspective. My Rabbi friend from LA, Haim dov Beliak, gets especially nervous when he hears talk like this. He runs a website called Jews on First (jewsonfirst.org) which is dedicated to keeping the wall between church and state high and strong. It is his contention that when that gets weakened, the ones who suffer are those who are not allowed to be part of that conversation about "virtue."
Here's the problem as it relates to this present discussion: there are those (especially those who promote Federalism and early Calvinism as a model for American society) who would, in fact, promote the suppression of gay rights or the rights of Muslims or the rights of many other minorities in our egalitarian society, in the name of "virtue" as "virtue" in their case would be defined according to their understanding of biblical Christianity. That's what makes Rabbi Beliak nervous – as he fears that the real agenda of those who think this way is to impose a narrow vision of evangelical Christianity on our pluralistic society – an imposition that would inevitably lead to the marginalization of those who aren't allowed to be part of that discussion.
If, as you seem to suggest, a public discourse on virtue would be exactly that – a "public" discourse, allowing for all voices to enter into the conversation – then I can't see how there could be any consensus on homosexuality, as even in Christian circles the mere mention of this topic leads to not only strong disagreement, but divisions. Those who believe homosexuality is evil will say that a virtuous society cannot countenance same sex marriage. Those who believe it is a natural part of the created order would say that a virtuous society must countenance same sex marriage. So who gets to determine how "virtue" is defined?
That's my problem with using this terminology – not the idea of promoting "virtue", but using it as a means to determine how legislation and laws are formulated. I'm a Calvinist, but I recognize that America could not have survived to become the pluralistic state it is today (a pluralism I celebrate as someone who has lived in the narrower confines of a Muslim society) if the New England Calvinists had had their way.
Tom,
Again I find it interesting and a bit archaic of you to be referring to Federalist and early Calvinist attitudes towards the role of virtue in a civil society. The Calvinists in this case were in league with the Federalists, as both worked to prevent the Jeffersonians, with their wild ideas about liberty and egalitarianism, from becoming a threat to a virtuous republic (which could, of course, not survive without a religiously Calvinist nanny).
A lot of people get nervous when Christians attempt to revive these earlier discussions about virtue, primarily because it is difficult to conceive how "virtue" can be defined apart from delegating that task to one particular religious perspective. My Rabbi friend from LA, Haim dov Beliak, gets especially nervous when he hears talk like this. He runs a website called Jews on First (jewsonfirst.org) which is dedicated to keeping the wall between church and state high and strong. It is his contention that when that gets weakened, the ones who suffer are those who are not allowed to be part of that conversation about "virtue."
Here's the problem as it relates to this present discussion: there are those (especially those who promote Federalism and early Calvinism as a model for American society) who would, in fact, promote the suppression of gay rights or the rights of Muslims or the rights of many other minorities in our egalitarian society, in the name of "virtue" as "virtue" in their case would be defined according to their understanding of biblical Christianity. That's what makes Rabbi Beliak nervous – as he fears that the real agenda of those who think this way is to impose a narrow vision of evangelical Christianity on our pluralistic society – an imposition that would inevitably lead to the marginalization of those who aren't allowed to be part of that discussion.
If, as you seem to suggest, a public discourse on virtue would be exactly that – a "public" discourse, allowing for all voices to enter into the conversation – then I can't see how there could be any consensus on homosexuality, as even in Christian circles the mere mention of this topic leads to not only strong disagreement, but divisions. Those who believe homosexuality is evil will say that a virtuous society cannot countenance same sex marriage. Those who believe it is a natural part of the created order would say that a virtuous society must countenance same sex marriage. So who gets to determine how "virtue" is defined?
That's my problem with using this terminology – not the idea of promoting "virtue", but using it as a means to determine how legislation and laws are formulated. I'm a Calvinist, but I recognize that America could not have survived to become the pluralistic state it is today (a pluralism I celebrate as someone who has lived in the narrower confines of a Muslim society) if the New England Calvinists had had their way.
Hi John,
You seem to be using ‘archaic’ in a pejorative sense. The same Aristotle that listed the cardinal virtues recognized the laws of logic that we now use to build information technology. You might criticize IT, but surely not because it is archaic. I hope you have not succumbed to neophilia.
Your invocation of pluralism is raises many questions. You ask ‘who gets to determine how “virtue” is defined?’ There are diametrically opposed views held by all kinds of different groups of people. Yes, many evangelical Christians oppose SSM, as do Muslims and at least some Buddhists. Does Muslim and Buddhist opposition earn more merit points than evangelicals? What basis will you find “to determine how legislation and laws are formulated?” How do you know that whatever view that finally is implemented will not marginalize some other groups?
I use the words of Madison because he is the acknowledged ‘Father of the Constitution’ and because my civic allegiance is to the Constitution. In theory, all public officials share this allegiance, hence their oath to ‘defend and uphold the Constitution.’ Our system of government, however degraded by the “political jealousy of some among us” is a Constitutional system instituted to preserve natural rights. It was brilliantly conceived by the founders, and no other form of government can match its ability to create an environment suitable for the flourishing of its citizens.
Hi John,
You seem to be using ‘archaic’ in a pejorative sense. The same Aristotle that listed the cardinal virtues recognized the laws of logic that we now use to build information technology. You might criticize IT, but surely not because it is archaic. I hope you have not succumbed to neophilia.
Your invocation of pluralism is raises many questions. You ask ‘who gets to determine how “virtue” is defined?’ There are diametrically opposed views held by all kinds of different groups of people. Yes, many evangelical Christians oppose SSM, as do Muslims and at least some Buddhists. Does Muslim and Buddhist opposition earn more merit points than evangelicals? What basis will you find “to determine how legislation and laws are formulated?” How do you know that whatever view that finally is implemented will not marginalize some other groups?
I use the words of Madison because he is the acknowledged ‘Father of the Constitution’ and because my civic allegiance is to the Constitution. In theory, all public officials share this allegiance, hence their oath to ‘defend and uphold the Constitution.’ Our system of government, however degraded by the “political jealousy of some among us” is a Constitutional system instituted to preserve natural rights. It was brilliantly conceived by the founders, and no other form of government can match its ability to create an environment suitable for the flourishing of its citizens.
Hi John,
You seem to be using ‘archaic’ in a pejorative sense. The same Aristotle that listed the cardinal virtues recognized the laws of logic that we now use to build information technology. You might criticize IT, but surely not because it is archaic. I hope you have not succumbed to neophilia.
Your invocation of pluralism is raises many questions. You ask ‘who gets to determine how “virtue” is defined?’ There are diametrically opposed views held by all kinds of different groups of people. Yes, many evangelical Christians oppose SSM, as do Muslims and at least some Buddhists. Does Muslim and Buddhist opposition earn more merit points than evangelicals? What basis will you find “to determine how legislation and laws are formulated?” How do you know that whatever view that finally is implemented will not marginalize some other groups?
I use the words of Madison because he is the acknowledged ‘Father of the Constitution’ and because my civic allegiance is to the Constitution. In theory, all public officials share this allegiance, hence their oath to ‘defend and uphold the Constitution.’ Our system of government, however degraded by the “political jealousy of some among us” is a Constitutional system instituted to preserve natural rights. It was brilliantly conceived by the founders, and no other form of government can match its ability to create an environment suitable for the flourishing of its citizens.
Tom:
Archaic: of, relating to, or characteristic of an earlier or more primitive time : antiquated
I am, in fact, saying that the use of this term is an attempt to re-capture an era that no longer exists – a nostalgic recreation of an era in American history that was more complex than it is often portrayed; certainly more complex than the romanticized/christianized version found in history books favored by Christian home schooling networks where the clash between enlightenment rationalists and pietistic Calvinists is papered over or ignored altogether.
Your reverence for the constitution is admirable and actually underscores the point I am making. Given the influence of men like Jefferson, our constitution deliberately avoided inserting the kind of theocratic language Calvinists would have preferred. It did not give the government the power to determine how "virtue" was to be defined. I don't believe, in fact, that the word "virtue" appears on its pages. It is, as many have pointed out, a true Enlightenment document that more or less ignores popular religious sentiment, particularly that favored by the Calvinists.
Tom:
Archaic: of, relating to, or characteristic of an earlier or more primitive time : antiquated
I am, in fact, saying that the use of this term is an attempt to re-capture an era that no longer exists – a nostalgic recreation of an era in American history that was more complex than it is often portrayed; certainly more complex than the romanticized/christianized version found in history books favored by Christian home schooling networks where the clash between enlightenment rationalists and pietistic Calvinists is papered over or ignored altogether.
Your reverence for the constitution is admirable and actually underscores the point I am making. Given the influence of men like Jefferson, our constitution deliberately avoided inserting the kind of theocratic language Calvinists would have preferred. It did not give the government the power to determine how "virtue" was to be defined. I don't believe, in fact, that the word "virtue" appears on its pages. It is, as many have pointed out, a true Enlightenment document that more or less ignores popular religious sentiment, particularly that favored by the Calvinists.
Tom:
Archaic: of, relating to, or characteristic of an earlier or more primitive time : antiquated
I am, in fact, saying that the use of this term is an attempt to re-capture an era that no longer exists – a nostalgic recreation of an era in American history that was more complex than it is often portrayed; certainly more complex than the romanticized/christianized version found in history books favored by Christian home schooling networks where the clash between enlightenment rationalists and pietistic Calvinists is papered over or ignored altogether.
Your reverence for the constitution is admirable and actually underscores the point I am making. Given the influence of men like Jefferson, our constitution deliberately avoided inserting the kind of theocratic language Calvinists would have preferred. It did not give the government the power to determine how "virtue" was to be defined. I don't believe, in fact, that the word "virtue" appears on its pages. It is, as many have pointed out, a true Enlightenment document that more or less ignores popular religious sentiment, particularly that favored by the Calvinists.
In an email that Nicholas Wolterstorff just sent to me regarding the question of "Who Should define Marriage?" he observes that "It is also true of the Dutch — and, so I am told, of many other European countries — that they make a sharp break betwenn civil and religious marriage." He then adds that "A good deal of our problem here in the US is that for historical reasons that I am ignorant of, we do not."
In an email that Nicholas Wolterstorff just sent to me regarding the question of "Who Should define Marriage?" he observes that "It is also true of the Dutch — and, so I am told, of many other European countries — that they make a sharp break betwenn civil and religious marriage." He then adds that "A good deal of our problem here in the US is that for historical reasons that I am ignorant of, we do not."
In an email that Nicholas Wolterstorff just sent to me regarding the question of "Who Should define Marriage?" he observes that "It is also true of the Dutch — and, so I am told, of many other European countries — that they make a sharp break betwenn civil and religious marriage." He then adds that "A good deal of our problem here in the US is that for historical reasons that I am ignorant of, we do not."