Tag Archive for: Iran

The moral questions suggested by Syria and Iran are quite different in my view, and for that reason the moral considerations in each case are also different.    

While the Iranian situation may be the more dangerous of the two, it is the more familiar.  Using just war teaching, which is the tradition of theorizing about war found in the Roman Catholic, Lutheran and Reformed churches, we could certainly make a case that self-defense, a prima facie just cause in just war theory, provides appropriate grounds for military action, particularly because of the nuclear danger, but also because of Iran’s demonstrated support for international terrorist organizations.  Note that a successful case will require a clear demonstration not only of Iran’s nuclear intentions but also of its ability to succeed in these ambitions.  In other words, just war theory requires more than a recognition that a regime or leader is evil; we need also to know that this evil poses a threat to international order.

Just cause, however, is not the only criterion that a military response must satisfy.  In this case, we might be especially interested in proportionality of ends (the good achieved by the use of the force must be greater than the harms done), reasonable hope of success, and last resort.  My own view is that the case for military action in Iran fails all three of these tests. In particular, I find it hard to conclude that a well-designed sanctions regime tied to rigorous international inspections will not be able to yield results. And when compared with the long-term negative consequences and the inherent difficulty of pursuing the military option in Iran, a stronger sanctions/inspection approach looks far more likely to move us towards improved relations in the region. 

In contrast, the situation in Syria is more difficult, albeit less dangerous for international order. The difficulty stems from the fact that our moral reflections with regard to armed humanitarian interventions into states are considerably less well developed than our reflections on war between states.  Since 1648 (the Peace of Westphalia), international norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention have persisted more or less without interruption, until very recently.  It’s not obvious how just war theory could be understood to apply to cases like Syria (or other recent cases, such as Libya) without considerable revision of the theory itself. 

What are some of the moral differences?  Well, it’s complicated.  Can just cause, for instance, be understood to include the punishment of evil such as we see in Syria today?  International law permits no such understanding: self-defense and collective security are the only just causes for war under international law.  What are the risks of broadening this justification?  Right intention is another just war criterion—the intent in a particular action must be in accord with the just cause and not for another cause.  Most armed interventions are not humanitarian—how are we to establish right motives in humanitarian interventions?  How are we even going to measure them?  So my first impulse with regard to the Syrian case is to appeal for more good theoretical work to be done on the matter of just humanitarian action.

Of course, my appeal for more theory will do little for policy-makers who must make decisions at a speed that makes theorists tremble.  And it particularly does nothing for those most affected : the Syrian people themselves.  So again I begin with just war theory.  Here, I’m particularly concerned about the prospects for success—the Syrian military poses a far greater challenge than was faced in Libya, for example.  Whether the good of the end is proportional to the harm that will result is also unclear, in my view.  I fully recognize my limitations in making those judgments.  But these criteria suggest to me that military intervention in Syria would be unwise.

On the question of expanding just cause to include the punishment of evils taking place entirely within states, the criterion of right authority may provide guidance.  The United Nation’s role as the institution capable of determining violations of collective security (its “Chapter 7” powers) may provide grounds for asserting its place as the “right authority” for justifying military intervention on humanitarian grounds.  I wonder also whether the UN might provide prudential checks against violation of other just war criteria as we consider intervention.  That might help resolve some of the concerns I noted above as we consider this revision of just war theory.

A final, and more personal, note.  I’m writing on Good Friday (yes, I’m late—apologies all around).  To think about state massacres, nuclear weapons and international terrorism on such a day as today is a reminder that Christianity is more than a theory or political commentary.  Christianity has at its center the story of man brutally tortured and killed by powers interested in maintaining their own power against a man challenging their authority.  The wonder, of course, is that in his defeat of those powers three days later, Jesus proclaimed the coming of a Kingdom based not on violence and war, but on something far more powerful.  

Just war theory is often said to have a bias for peace, and indeed this is so: it was designed to place limits on the ways that armies kill each other. (In fact, its seventh criterion is that a just war must aim at peace). But peace is not its only bias. The victory over death signifies a victory over oppression and violence and injustice.  Just war theory also contains a bias for justice: if we can act against injustice, we must act.  For it’s in the coming together of peace and justice that we discover the foundations of Christ’s new Kingdom.