Where Should We Go From Here?

Lawyers, Professors and Citizens

When I first read Adam’s piece I planned to engage in the argument—we disagree on so many things. But, at this point I do not think that would be helpful, especially given the exchange between Adam and Mikhael. Instead I’d like to write to the readers about where I think we should go from here.

Long ago when I practiced law I spent a lot of time in the courtroom. This was a good place for me because I am by nature argumentative and competitive. I like to win. It was also a bad place for me because by nature I am argumentative and competitive. Winning is too important to me. Being a litigator brought out aspects of my personality that on my best days I work to suppress.

When I left the practice of law to become a college professor I thought I was leaving competition behind me; I was wrong. While lawyers might manipulate facts and the law to win, academics often use jargon to dismiss others. I struggle with this every day because I can be really good at it. I struggle with it in my writing and I struggle with it in the classroom. When I teach, I can be tempted to see the classroom like I saw the courtroom—a place to instruct and to win. If you see things differently than I do, you are wrong. Let me tell you all the ways in which you are wrong.

But, teaching is different than litigating. Though I often instruct, my main job is different. When I am at my best I spend my time helping students to understand what they believe about the world, who they are in the world, and how they are to engage a world that is fallen but has been redeemed. This takes a gentleness that does not come to me by nature. It takes willingness to stand in the shoes of another and it takes humility and delight in learning from those who differ from me. My students are gay, straight, conservative, liberal, undocumented, African American, Caucasian, Asian, Native American, Christian, atheist, wealthy, poor, middle- class, male, female, transgender and so much more. I have taught for over twenty years and I still learn more from students than I give them. This staggers me.

Mikhael, Adam and I are all Christians, all trained similarly in the field of politics and law. But, we see the world differently. We interpret history differently, and we value early theorists and church leaders differently. So, is the primary issue who is right? Or, is the primary issue how we will live together despite our differences?

As I said in my original piece, I do not think the key issue is the nature of marriage. I think the key issue is the role of government. Is the role of government to elevate the right way of doing things? Or, is the role of government to accommodate and organize, so far as possible, different ways of being in the world?

If the job of government is to get it right, and have us all live according to the right, then I see no hope in this world for peace and respect. Here we have three white, upper-middle class highly educated Christian academics, similar in our orientations, teaching at similar schools –who nonetheless disagree about something so foundational to human life. If we can’t agree, who can? If government is going to be about one of our perspectives winning, then government will never be more than majority and minority perspectives trying to gain ground.

I think that Christian citizens need to focus more on accommodating differences than on winning the argument. The real challenge is in figuring out what the accommodation should look like. Under what circumstances might accommodation of different perspectives be a matter of justice? And, under what circumstances might accommodation of different perspectives lead to harm?

Public opinion and law are beginning to reflect what I think of as a just way of treating LGBT citizens. For me this is cause for rejoicing. But people who think like I do must challenge ourselves to also think about those who differ from us. What does it mean to do justice to those who view the world as Adam does? What room should they have in society to organize their families, places of worship or places of business according to their deepest beliefs?

This is a really hard task. Sometimes it is easier to just try and win the argument.

Marriage, Raising Children, and the Ideal Family

First of all, I thank Adam for sharing his perspective. It is now clear we have a robust debate on this question!  And while I disagree with many of the arguments Adam outlines in his essay, I appreciate his vigorous defense of traditional marriage and his willingness to engage arguments to the contrary.     

I value many aspects of Adam’s argument. His primary concern for the well being of children is evident in his essay, and is something all three contributors to this month’s discussion undoubtedly share. We all want children to grow in loving and nurturing families, though we may disagree on how to achieve this. His thorough analysis of certain facets of my argument was also constructive. While I do not have time to discuss each of his critiques in this response, his comments have enabled me to better reflect upon the various factors that inform my position on this issue. Lastly, the number of outside sources Adam included in his essay is impressive and no doubt helpful for readers who want to read further on this topic. I won’t come close to matching this number of sources in this essay.

In responding to Adam’s argument, I will leave many of the possible legal objections to Julia who has a legal background. My challenges to Adam’s argument come primarily from my interest in public policy. My concerns regarding Adam’s arguments are two-fold: 1) He confounds the goals of marriage with the goals of raising children. They are related but they are not the same and should be treated separately, and 2) he upholds an ideal of family that is unnecessarily exclusive and does not create opportunities for other members of society to love and care for children when this ideal is inevitably unmet. I outline each of these concerns below.    

Promoting Marriage / Raising Children

Adam’s primary argument that same-sex marriage is about raising children reminds of a similar argument that Adam is not making but operates in a similar fashion. In the contemporary debate over police brutality against African-Americans, the discussion often devolves to encompass black on black violence as though it was connected to instances in which police officers may have abused their authority.  While both of these issues require the public’s attention and relate to some of the same conditions, each issue is driven by a different process and societal problem. As a result, each requires its own public policy solution. I view Adam’s argument in much of the same way. Promoting marriage and raising children are two different matters, and should be treated distinctively. 

Marriage is a commitment between two people, in which they share in each other’s lives and rely upon each other for emotional, financial, and spiritual support. Married couples also fulfill each other’s sexual needs.  For Christians, marriage is also an opportunity to intimately understand Christ’s self-sacrifice in the context of a physical human relationship. These relationships necessitate a certain level of legal protections so that couples can pursue this type of commitment. Marriage does not always include children, though children can benefit from a healthy marriage. 

Raising children is about instilling values and moral content into a child as well as providing for his or her immediate needs. The rearing of children does not necessitate marriage, though it is certainly preferred. Even within the context of a marriage commitment, other actors inevitably contribute to raising upright, thoughtful, and well-adjusted children. These actors are found in churches, schools, neighborhoods, communities, and the public sector. While marriage is the most important institution in raising children, it is not the only institution at work.  

My point is that what is required for marriage and what is required for raising children is not always the same, though they share similar characteristics. Moreover, conflating marriage and raising children clouds both our understanding of marriage and parenting. If we assume that a marriage is only fully realized when it results in children, we minimize the powerful role that simply marriage can have in society. I know many married couples that don’t have children, but who are a blessing to those around them, including children. What do we tell these couples if we are using Adam’s definition of marriage? Is their marriage a sham? Do we assume they are being selfish because they don’t have children? 

More importantly, confusing marriage with raising children in effect places all of the challenges of raising children squarely on the institution of marriage. Thus, if a child is struggling, we only look to his or her parents to ‘fix’ the problem. In the process, we ignore the many cultural, economic, and political conditions in society that contribute to a child’s upbringing. In his essay, Adam provides a heartbreaking list of outcomes that follow from children born out of wedlock including poverty, lack of education, incarceration, sexual abuse, drug abuse, and depression. Does he really think that healthy marriages will effectively address all of these conditions? These are larger injustices that must be addressed through community and effective public policy. 

In a bizarre twist, Adam seems to wrap up all of these social ills and cast them in the same lot as same-sex relationships in the quote below:

Same-sex couples did not create that mess. But to create equality between marriage and “same-sex marriage” would require us to break the remaining normative bonds of the only institution capable of fixing the problem.

I can only gather that Adam believes that gays and lesbians cannot or are not interested in helping solve the social problems above as parents, citizens, or Christians. This assertion is terribly unfair to gays and lesbians or needs much more clarification. Close to this point in his essay, Adam pleads with both Julia and me for another solution to these problems besides traditional marriage. I have only one response to sin—Jesus. Thankfully, we can see the redemption power of Jesus at work through marriage as well as churches, communities, various organizations, and government.   

The Ideal Family

Adam bases much of his argument for traditional marriage on the natural parental rights of the mother and father. Take for example, the quote below:

To make “same-sex marriage” equal to marriage in law would require undermining the rights of natural parents and children, and would entail the elimination of the legal incidents of natural parentage.

In using this basis for marriage, he adopts the ideal family structure. Such a framework assumes it is possible and preferable for all couples to conceive and to rear this child together. However, our world is far from ideal. While this ideal is often the case, countless individuals, couples, and children face a different reality that Adam does not acknowledge. As a result, Adam’s conceptualization excludes many other instances of a loving and supportive family. For instance, my wife and I have not been able to conceive and are currently in the process of adoption. In reading Adam’s essay, I couldn’t help but feel a bit inferior (I know this was not his intent). We are not the ideal, but we will deeply cherish the child we ultimately adopt. I could imagine other untraditional family structures that embrace children who long for a loving home. 

To simply base families on God’s original design of procreation precludes all of the wonderful and unexpected things God can reveal through other non-natal relationships and the broader community. The Bible is full of accounts of unorthodox or unconventional families that God used to bring His people closer to Him. Narrowly defining family as natural parental rights denies us the full richness and possibilities of God’s creation. Using this definition also makes it easy to forget the role of extended family members, churches, and various forms of community in building strong families. I am thankful that when I have children, I will have a supportive community to lean on and God will use many of these people to touch and shape the life of my child. 

In raising this concern, I am certainly not denying the rightful natural legal rights of both parents. Whether or not these unconventional family arrangements extend to same-sex couples is a position I am not prepared to defend. I believe this is a separate discussion. My point is much broader. By insisting on this ideal family structure, we are likely neglecting members of our community that are marginalized, forgotten, oppressed, or wounded. The Christian faith is transformative in these latter cases. In these moments, we are challenged to awkwardly and stubbornly love others, not out of some sort of biological attachment, but out of our understanding of God.  

Marriage is for Children

I am grateful for Harold Heie’s invitation to participate in this conversation. I do not know whether I am being pulled off the bench like a third-string quarterback or out of the bullpen like a star closer. (I’ll imagine it is the latter, though I suspect it is the former.) Either way, I hope not to besmirch the playing field that my predecessors in this exchange have graced with their able remarks.

Because I was invited to join this conversation after it started, and due to constraints of time and space, much of what follows only summarizes more extensive research and arguments that others and I have published elsewhere. I provide links to several of the extended versions.

The Leading Question

Like Eve Tushnet in the first month, I am compelled at the outset to challenge the boundaries of our leading question. Our host states two versions of it. One version is “whether allowing same-sex marriage is good public policy.” Whatever it is, who is not allowing it? To not give something an official status in law is not to ban it, nor is it to fail to allow it. As I’ve explained elsewhere, laws defining marriage according to their natural contours as a man-woman union never operated as a ban on same-sex relationships. Many, many individuals and religious associations celebrated what they called “same-sex marriage” without any criminal or civil liability or other sanction. The “same-sex marriage ban” was a rhetorical fabrication constructed to make marriage revisionism appear to be on the side of liberty despite its documented hostility to the natural rights of children (about which more below), religious liberty, and other fundamental freedoms.

The other version of the question is only slightly less loaded: “Given the pluralistic nature of American society, what stance should Christians take relative to public policy for or against same-sex marriage?” That seems to me something like asking whether, given American pluralism, Christians should oppose a policy that approves moving bodies staying at rest. The law of inertia will not change whatever public policies say. And the objective truth about inertia matters not just in theoretical, but also in practical inquiry. To allow cars to proceed without braking at red lights might feel liberating…

Our leading questions are like that question, with two differences that make them even more problematic. First, the cause of “same-sex marriage” has wrapped itself in the mantle of civil rights so that anyone who expresses support for natural marriage laws is often branded as a bigot, excluded from polite society and various scholarly journals and venues, and made to bear other costs. The Respectful Conversations project is a unique opportunity to show the world that we can achieve disagreement in good faith, and the previous entries in this series admirably avoid unpleasantness. Yet few issues in public discourse today are more likely to incite ad hominem than this month’s topic.

Second, the stakes concealed by a misleading issue statement are much higher when one is ignoring the natural laws of human sexuality and procreation than when one is ignoring the natural laws of physics. Writing traffic laws that defy the law of inertia causes car wrecks. Writing marriage laws that defy the natural rights of children to have a father and mother causes wrecked human beings. And, as we know, human beings are eternal beings.

The Chasm Between Us

Among other assumptions, the leading questions presuppose that there is such a thing as “same-sex marriage.” If it was banned by laws defining marriage as a man-woman union then it must have possessed an existent, definable reality before its recognition in law.

That has not been demonstrated. And the leading question does not invite its demonstration. Yet neither of my interlocutors chafes at its direction. Instead they add additional, problematic premises that we have neither space nor time to discuss and which move us even farther away from mutual understanding:

  • a dichotomous choice between theonomy and pluralism (Stronks) that omits the central tradition of thought about law, to which so many great and intellectually virtuous Christian thinkers (and lesser, aspiring-to-be-intellectually-continent thinkers, such as I) have recently contributed and which since Thomas Aquinas has cultivated a non-paternalistic, perfectionist pluralism that avoids the excesses of both legalism and moral pluralism (Pelz leaves space for this tradition in his essay);
  • a premise that the Obergefell majority’s opinion obligates some non-official citizens to act as if marriage is something other than a man-woman union (Pelz) which conflicts with a tradition stretching from Augustine to Martin Luther King Jr. and beyond that stands firm in the conviction that a positive law contrary to the natural law is unjust, and is, in the important sense of its efficacy to obligate, not law;
  • a presupposition that a change in law can make a social phenomenon that was not—“same-sex marriage”—into something that is (Stronks and Pelz), which stands in considerable tension with the strengthening consensus among social scientists and public figures on the left and right that children flourish when raised by a married mother and father, that they do best when raised by their own biological mother and father, and that natural marriage is sui generis in this regard (among others);
  • an unstated assumption (Stronks and Pelz) that marriage will retain its norms—monogamy (two people), fidelity (to each other only), non-consanguinity (not close blood relations), permanence (for life)—without the foundational norm that renders those norms rational—conjugality (man-woman union)—after some of the best contemporary thinkers on both sides of the question have argued (persuasively, it seems to me) that the redefinition of marriage logically entails the elimination of those norms (see here, here, here, and here);
  • the unexplained assertion (Pelz), “Granting same-sex couples the fundamental right to marry in the eyes of the state allow gays and lesbians to enter into public life as free individuals”;
  • the suggestion that owners of a bakery in Oregon denied service to a lesbian couple qua lesbians (Pelz), contrary to the facts of the case;
  • the premise (Pelz) that the legal obligation of state officials to “follow the law” necessarily entails an obligation to communicate what they understand to be a falsehood about marriage, which is contestable; and
  • a premise (Stronks) that the majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges is law though she rightly acknowledges that the majority’s opinion “was not a legal argument.”

Any one of those notions could be the subject of its own respectful conversation and each is problematic. The last, for example, rests upon a collapse of the distinction between law and judgment, so central to Hamilton’s argument in Federalist 78 for ratification of the federal judicial power. Stronks paraphrases Hamilton: “that the Court is the least dangerous branch of government because it has neither the power of the purse nor the power of the sword.” But Hamilton went on in the same sentence to explain more comprehensively that the judiciary “can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE [executive power] nor WILL [law-making power], but merely judgment.” Judgment follows law.

So much for that. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this most unusual moment in American history is the extent to which courts inventing “same-sex marriage” (without explaining or even defining it) have been willing—eager—to mischaracterize the law, flout clear law that cannot be mischaracterized, misrepresent and ignore the facts of the cases actually before them and invent findings that are non-factual, violate basic canons of reason and interpretation and make up new law instead, and generally act as laws unto themselves.

This lawlessness is not unprecedented. As Chief Justice Roberts observed in his Obergefell dissent, the federal judiciary acted lawlessly during the Dred Scott v. Sandford and Lochner v. New York eras. No one now rests claims of legal obligation on those majority opinions. Abraham Lincoln deserves much credit for this. In his First Inaugural Address (and elsewhere), directing his attention to the Dred Scott ruling he emphatically refuted the notion that the Constitution means what the Court says it means in any given decision. Today, the Court’s assertion of judicial supremacy is contested by a growing number of eminent scholars on both the left (eg, Tushnet and Waldron) and the right (eg, Meese and George) (see, eg, this one, this one, this one, this one, this one, this one, this one, this one, this one, this one, this one, this one, this one, this one, and most directly on point, this group (of which I am a member).)

Bridging the Chasm: What Marriage Is

Those are other conversations. And unlike my interlocutors, I have only one bite at this apple. In approximately 3000 words I cannot hope to bridge the chasm that obviously lies between us. It has taken me a third of my allotted space just to survey that chasm.

In the space remaining, let us simplify. The question for those who believe there is such a thing as “same-sex marriage” is simply this: What is marriage?

That is itself a vast question. (To get a sense of it I recommend this book, this book, and this book.) To reach as far as I can across this chasm, I’ll restate the fundamental question more modestly: If marriage is not a man-woman union then what else could it possibly consist of? A comprehensive definition of the term, complete with limiting principles and elements and exceptions rationally grounded in those principles, would enable my interlocutors to make an argument for the redefinition of marriage (something they have not attempted). But given that we are still in the early days of this social experiment, so unprecedented in human history, perhaps it is more realistic to ask our friends who support the experiment only to lay the groundwork for the scaffolding on which the basic elements of an argument could be constructed. I would be happy to see Stronks and Pelz offer a focal instance of marriage, or identify the essential characteristics of marriage and distinguish them from peripheral and non-essential traits.

For an argument that justice requires “same-sex marriage,” “same-sex marriage” must first be shown to be a plausible idea. And for “same-sex marriage” to be a plausible idea, marriage must essentially consist only of those features that same-sex intimacy and real marriage have in common, such as adult companionship, romance, and sexual gratification. Its essence cannot include the connection between sex and procreation. Nor can the marriage right be grounded in the teleology of the human sexual organs, or the basic good of conjugal union, or the natural duties that parents owe to their biological children.

Yet those features of human nature and natural law are precisely what marriage has always consisted of in its essence. In particular, as I have explained in some detail elsewhere, the fundamental right of marriage is necessarily and essentially grounded in the natural duties that mother and father owe to their children and the corresponding rights of children to have legal connections to, and support from, their own mother and father. Those jural relations, being grounded in nature and established since before ancient memory, are pre-political and pre-legal—fundamental rights and duties.

This is our long-standing fundamental rights jurisprudence, undisturbed throughout the history of Anglo-American law and always affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, until just yesterday. Apart from the shameful period of antebellum jurisprudence that made states’ positive laws completely sovereign over domestic relations, the Court was unwavering that the natural family’s sanctity is located within the freedom to “marry and reproduce,” which is grounded in intrinsic human nature, not state law, and “is older than the Bill of Rights.” Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform. (See also Reynolds v. United States, Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, Loving v. Virginia, Moore v. City of East Cleveland.)

The legal norms of marriage have always included the moral norms of natural law not because American evangelical Protestant Christians said so but because they are natural rights and duties arising from a biological reality: Sex between a man and woman has consequences, namely offspring. Marriage is pre-political and fundamental, existing in all known civilizations as a man-woman institution to link fathers and mothers to their children by binding them to each other for life.

Marriage exists in law as a solution to a very practical problem, a problem exacerbated by the redefinition of marriage that Stronks and Pelz support. (It is not just a religious institution and a moral institution, though Stronks’ and Pelz’s proposals pose existential threats to those facets of marriage, too). This problem has been on display since the beginning of this experiment in 2003. Consider the dissent of Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Justice Cordy in the first decision to redefine marriage, which I discuss in this essay,

Cordy explained the problem this way:

Whereas the relationship between mother and child is demonstratively and predictably created and recognizable through the biological process of pregnancy and childbirth, there is no corresponding process for creating a relationship between father and child.

The design given to us by the laws of nature and nature’s God—real, man-woman marriage—is the only known solution to this problem. And Justice Cordy warned:

The alternative, a society without the institution of marriage, in which heterosexual intercourse, procreation, and child care are largely disconnected processes, would be chaotic.

We are witnessing that social chaos in many of America’s cities today, including my adopted hometown of Montgomery, Alabama. Here, more than two-thirds of children are born out of wedlock and are therefore at elevated risk of all the well-known negative outcomes—poverty, lack of education, unemployment, incarceration, sexual abuse, drug abuse, depression, and much else. Same-sex couples did not create that mess. But to create equality between marriage and “same-sex marriage” would require us to break the remaining normative bonds of the only institution capable of fixing the problem.

Do Stronks and Pelz have another solution to offer? I am sure that they share my concern for the rights and well-being of children. I take it that we disagree about the nature of those rights and the best means to promote children’s well-being.

The Elimination of Marital Norms

If Stronks and Pelz intend to proffer the norms of marriage as a solution then they need to offer new justifications for those norms grounded in their new, as-yet unexplained idea of what marriage is. By eliminating the predicate of natural marriage from law, their position eliminates the rationale of the norms of natural marriage. They cannot help themselves to what they wish to abrogate.

“Same-sex marriage” is parasitic on real marriage, and “marriage equality” is fatal to the host. To make “same-sex marriage” equal to marriage in law would require undermining the rights of natural parents and children, and would entail the elimination of the legal incidents of natural parentage. In sum, to make same-sex commitment the same as marriage in law would require eliminating all of the essential features of marriage in law that secure the right of each child to be connected to her mother and her father.

This is not just a theoretical problem; it affects human beings. Every child has both a mother and a father and children are most likely to flourish when raised by their own mother and father. We cannot re-write the laws of human nature any more than we can re-write the law of inertia. By flouting the natural law we only harm ourselves.

In this light, I think it is telling that no state has yet made marriage the same as “same-sex marriage” in law. Indeed, full equality between marriage and “same-sex marriage” does not exist even in states such as Massachusetts and New York that began experimenting with marriage redefinition years ago. Those states and others maintain three distinct institutions with different incidents, presumptions, rights, and duties attached to them—(1) marriage, (2) man-man “marriage,” and (3) woman-woman “marriage.”

I have examined this phenomenon in a scholarly article and in a shorter essay. Consider one example. Massachusetts retains the presumption of paternity, though the courts have made a hash of it while trying to shoe-horn it into relationships where it makes no sense. It can never apply to a man-man “marriage,” and it cannot apply to a woman-woman “marriage” without the biological father’s consent, nor without permanently eliminating the office of father in the child’s life, thus destroying the only two purposes of the presumption.

None of this dissuades proponents of “same-sex marriage” from trying to eliminate legal connections between each child and his or her biological father and mother. Sexual-identity activists are busy pressing that agenda through the courts as I write this. And it is true that a woman-woman marriage can be made to mimic a real marriage by recasting the presumption of paternity as a “presumption of parentage.” But observe what such mimicry does to parental and marital norms. It eliminates the biological father’s parental rights without preserving the fiction of marital fidelity.

In short, same-sex “marriage” cannot be made the same as natural marriage in law without either eliminating the presumption of paternity or so radically altering it that it no longer serves its purpose. That is just one example. Other differences between natural marriage and “same-sex marriage” persist throughout the law despite the overwhelming campaign by America’s most powerful elites for equality.

So, which institution is on the wrong side of history? The history of the effort to redefine marriage has not yet been written. And the rights of children are holding on (for now) against the barrage though they have the active defense of only of a few, and the silent support of half the American people.

The chaos of fatherlessness is just one of the many harms that we perpetuate by eliminating marital norms from our laws. Many more harms are being documented on a near-daily basis. The next frontiers, already being pushed, are a constitutional right to polygamy and a right for man-man couples to rent wombs from surrogate mothers, two practices that are known to exploit women. The redefinition of marriage has already been used to force Catholic Charities to stop providing adoptions services, imposed the spectre of legal action on the Sisters of St. Joseph of Boston for running a parochial school according to their convictions, caused what was to be the first Christian law school in Canada at Trinity Western University to go to court to vindicate its right to exist, forced Christian student groups off university campuses, and cost accomplished people of faith and moral convictions their hard-earned reputations and careers, including the distinguished former fire chief of Atlanta, Kelvin Cochran.

There are peaceful solutions to these controversies (eg, this one and this one), but they will not be achieved until marriage revisionists acknowledge that those of us who continue to testify about the distinct value of natural marriage have sound reasons for doing so, not because we are bigots (or “cherry-picking which sins should be restricted by government,” as Stronks speculates). Pelz correctly acknowledges that many of us act in good-faith obedience to conscience and not out of enmity. That is a promising starting place for a respectful conversation.

The Honor of Rebuilding and Defending Marriage

To observe that we should aspire to the courageous witness of Catholic Charities, the Sisters of St. Joseph, and Kelvin Cochran is not to disparage the virtue of my interlocutors. I have kept my contribution to this discussion at the level of reasons rather than sub-rational motivations. I do not know whether those who disagree with me are angry, as Stronks assumes of those who object to the Obergefell ruling, or anxious, as Pelz assumes of unnamed culture warriors, and I do not intend to speculate.

Yet I continue to think that we—all Americans, but especially Christians—have a responsibility to rebuild our broken marriage culture and defend the laws that protect children, rather than encouraging the elimination of natural marriage’s remaining vestiges.

And what an honor we have to live in the one moment in human history when we have the opportunity to defend and rebuild—like Nehemiah simultaneously rebuilding the walls of Jerusalem and defending her from her enemies—the most foundational institution in all human civilizations!

Advancing Biblical, Civic Justice Even If You Believe Homosexual Relationships are Sinful

Thank you for this opportunity to write about the issue of same-sex marriage through the eyes of faith. I’ve read all of the preceding articles and am grateful to everyone for their thoughtful pieces. I’m particularly appreciative of the constitutional perspectives provided by Kathryn Lee and Micah Watson. I write this piece taking the next step, applying their foundational arguments to the specific policy of same-sex marriage.

I am a political science professor and a lawyer.  For the past twenty-five years of my professional career I’ve written books on First Amendment jurisprudence and articles on same-sex marriage. And, one of the things that surprises me and keeps me interested is that my perspective on both of these topics has changed over time.  Partly my views have changed because my understanding of hermeneutics has changed. Partly my views have changed because I have had decades in which to have watched the Supreme Court’s decisions and their aftermath. I agree with Alexander Hamilton that the Court is the least dangerous branch of government because it has neither the power of the purse nor the power of the sword. And, I hold tightly the words of the Apostle Paul, that in this earthly life we see through a glass darkly; we see only in part.

One more identifier: I was raised in the Christian Reformed Church but now am part of the Presbyterian Church USA, a denomination that recently voted to allow pastors to marry same-sex couples. I used to believe that homosexuality was a result of the Fall; love the sinner but hate the sin.  I no longer believe that this is the correct understanding of Scripture. But, I argue that no matter what Christians think about homosexuality, we should all support the legal recognition of same-sex marriage as a matter of Biblical civic justice.

The first part of this essay explains why I believe all Christians should support same-sex marriage as a matter of policy. The second part addresses the Supreme Court case Obergefell v Hodges, and the third comments briefly on living in the midst of our confusion about homosexuality.

What Does God Want Government to Do?

This may seem counter-intuitive but I’d say you can’t start a conversation about same-sex marriage policy by focusing on marriage.  You have to start by looking at the foundations of public policy: what is the government supposed to do?

Christians have engaged in public policy discussion in a lot of different ways and sometimes it is hard to tell how Christians differ from the rest of the country in their argument about certain issues. But, when Christians talk about a biblically based role for government (as opposed to issue advocacy) they generally fall into one of two categories: theomony or pluralism.

Theonomy

Some Christians believe that God intends their Christian worldview to be the law of the land. They point to the Old Testament laws of Israel and argue that if something is a sin it ought to also be illegal. Government and church are not differentiated. God’s desire for one is the same as God’s desire for the other. 

These Christians would argue that same-sex marriage ought not to be legally recognized. Homosexual relationships are wrong; therefore, government should not recognize these marriages.

Though I disagree with this approach to government I respect it when people are consistent in their effort to make sin or wrongs illegal.  If one says that God forbids homosexual relationships—thus they should not be legitimated by the government—then one must also say God forbids lust, greed, failure to care for the poor and so forth.  If Christians emphasize the use of government to achieve all of God’s directives in life then they are consistent in their understanding of a biblical view of government. I might disagree, but I can respect the fact that they are not cherry-picking which sins should be restricted by government.  

Pluralism

There is, however, a different biblical approach to government, one that has its roots in Reformed sphere sovereignty and Catholic subsidiarity. It has been advanced most practically by theologian and Prime Minister Abraham Kuyper of the Netherlands and it focuses on biblically based pluralism. This approach takes Scripture seriously but it differentiates between God’s will for government and God’s will for the church. Christians in this tradition say that God is Lord of all creation, including government. But, they argue, God created a lot of different institutions and these institutions all have their own God-ordained functions. The government is not a church. While a church’s function is to help a body of believers worship God and follow God’s commandments, the function of a government is to establish justice. And, the justice that a government should seek is for everyone, not just the Christians.

This perspective involves two kinds of pluralism: institutional and confessional pluralism. 

  •  Institutional pluralism draws from a Reformed theological concept of sphere sovereignty to demonstrate that in public life there are many different ways in which we engage the world.  We are family members; we worship; we can be entrepreneurs.  And, it is important to remember that the institutions that support these activities have different responsibilities.  A church is not a family; a family is not a business; a government is not a church.  Our responsibility is to think through the different callings of these different institutions.  God’s creation can flourish only when there is room in society for people to function in all the different capacities that God has called them to.
  •  Confessional pluralism means that while we live in a broken world we recognize that people have to have room to live according to the worldview they feel called to. For Christians thinking about citizenship the important question is what sorts of responsibilities do governments have toward people of other worldviews and faith traditions?

 The Biblical foundation for this kind of pluralism is centered in three different places.  First, the Old Testament is filled with directives from the prophets that demonstrate civil authorities have a responsibility to the poor, the sick, and those without power.  The books of Micah and Amos are replete with commands to those in authority to do justice and to let justice roll down like a river.  Isaiah 65 describes for us what a good city should look like: the people are healthy and live to an old age; conflict is handled and peace reigns; the vineyards yield fruit; people will not labor in vain but will enjoy their labor and live in houses that they build. Justice is connected to healthy, flourishing communities. 

Second, Christ’s life demonstrates that the Kingdom of God is not to be brought about by the sword.  Christ used stories, persuasion and encouragement to demonstrate what our lives should be in this world.  Political pluralism is a tool that protects other institutions as they engage in other kinds of persuasive work.  The church has room to be what the church is called to be. Families and businesses have room to flourish in the way that they are called. There is room to share the love of Christ and to act in accordance with the way Christ calls us to live, but there is not room to coerce others to do the same.

 Third, in the parable of the wheat and tares (Matthew 13) Christ shows us that it is not our job to separate the wheat from the weeds.  In this parable the farmer’s workers asked if they should pull out the weeds from the fields.  The farmer said no.  So, the sun and the rain fell equally on the wheat and the weeds until the harvest. Political pluralism allows public, legal justice to fall equally on everyone in society, even if we consider that some of the people are weeds. 

Applying pluralism

So, as we apply this pluralism to our view of government we have to consider the responsibility of all these different institutions.  And, we have to think about what it means to do justice to people of worldviews other than our own.  Christians want government to recognize our right to shape institutions like schools, churches and non-profits according to our own worldview, but we also have to challenge ourselves to determine whether we are supportive of the worldview expression of other groups in society.  Is it more Biblical to encourage freedom of worldview no matter what the foundation of that worldview might be (pluralism), or is it more Biblical to support only institutions that reflect Christian presuppositions (theonomy)? Is the public square intended by God to be for everyone (pluralism) or mainly for Christians (theonomy)?

I fall into this pluralism approach to government and I strongly support the legal recognition of same-sex marriage.  I believe that all Christians no matter what their beliefs about homosexuality ought to support same-sex marriage as a matter of justice. The focus has to be on thinking about what it means to do justice to all people who are functioning in loving, committed relationships raising children, caring for each other and fulfilling all of the responsibilities that exist in marital unions. If the government chooses to benefit heterosexual marriages in particular ways then homosexual relationships functioning similarly should be benefited in exactly the same way.

 God created us with the ability to engage in political community and this engagement carries not just rights but obligations.  People in this pluralism perspective argue that Christian politics means that we must not look for privilege for our own perspective, whatever that might be. Rather we must seek to live with others in a fallen but redeemed world, sharing public goods and advocating for the well-being of all people. This requires that we listen to them about what their well-being entails. And, I’d say that Christians should be enthusiastic in their eagerness to achieve justice for LGBT people that have long been loving each other, caring for each other and raising children in ways that have benefited society over hundreds of years.

Obergefell v Hodges: a Supreme Court victory for public justice

I can’t talk about same-sex marriage policy without commenting on the most recent Supreme Court case. I know that a number of Christians were angry about the Court’s decision in Obergefell.  This anger seems to stem from two different sources.  Some were angry as a policy matter; they did not agree that LGBT unions should be recognized as marriage. Others were angry as a jurisprudential matter.  They felt that the Court overstepped its bounds in making this decision—a decision that ought to belong to legislators rather than judges. I disagree on both counts.

In June the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that marriage is a fundamental right and all states must recognize same-sex marriage. (Obergefell v Hodges) I like the public policy outcome because I think that it achieves justice for people in the gay community. I would also say that this case took an important step toward pluralism because the justices made some effort to outline protection for people of religious faith who do not support homosexuality. As a matter of jurisprudence I would point out that the Court based its decision on the Constitution’s 14th Amendment Equal Protection clause.  The purpose of the clause is to step in when majorities use their power to withhold equal protection of the law from minorities. Its very purpose is to control majoritarian legislatures—this was the intent of the Framers when they instituted the Bill of Rights and it was the intent of the framers of the 14th Amendment in the wake of the Civil War.

I appreciate the Court’s work. But, I do have some concerns about the opinion itself. The Court’s decision did little to guide us in balancing the rights of the gay community with the interests of conservative religious people. This balance is at the root of a lot of conflict in the areas of employment and consumer protection. It’s also at the root of a lot of upcoming litigation.

Normally a Supreme Court decision not only settles an issue but gives guidance about how similar conflicts should be handled.  Those of us watching Obergefell expected the Court to do one of two things. It might have said that LGBT claims should be decided using a low level constitutional test called rational basis. When the rational basis test is used, government policy often stands even when it seems to discriminate. Or, the Court could have said LGBT claims receive the higher level strict scrutiny test. If strict scrutiny is invoked the group that brings the claim usually gets the discriminatory government policy tossed out. These tests are important because they let us know how to consider government policies that protect employment or consumer protection rights of LGBT people. 

In Obergefell the Court used neither test. The majority decision was a beautiful policy argument but it was not a legal argument. That’s disappointing for two reasons. First, it gives critics a lot of fodder for complaint and new litigation. Second, it misses an opportunity to provide important guidance for upcoming conflicts. It’s particularly frustrating in this case because there were a number of strong constitutional, legal arguments in favor of the Court’s decision. These arguments were laid out in briefs by parties arguing before several lower courts over the course of the last four years.  The briefs invoked not only both rational basis and strict scrutiny but, confusingly, a number of test levels in-between. Those arguments are so complicated and we really needed guidance about how to move forward.  Sadly, the Court’s decision did not help us.  There will be tons of litigation to follow.

Hermeneutics: a final comment on confusion about these matters

Because I teach at a Christian institution that values different Christian perspectives I have a vested interest in figuring out if Christians of different views on this topic can live and work together.  To some Christians, diversity on LGBT matters means a lot of straight Christians with different perspectives.  But, I do not think this works at all.  I think we have to have gay Christians among us to help us learn about and think about these matters.  These gay Christians will have to be very very strong in the face of those who disagree with them because disagreement might feel like rejection of the person.  But, I think this is the only way. It’s the only way because many of us, over the course of our lives, will see our perspectives change. The Church has to be a community that believes God is big enough to hold us even in our questions on these matters.

I said at the beginning of this essay that for me hermeneutics had changed. I was raised in the Calvinist tradition and in my community Scripture was to be read as literally as possible.  This created some challenges and we didn’t always handle the challenges well or with consistency. In my community God was male, and gendered differences were God-ordained with the female equal but not permitted to lead as the male does. The earth did not have four literal corners but it was a young earth created in seven days.  We kind of skipped over the dinosaur issue. And, we totally skipped over all questions of gender, sexual identity, and gender dysphoria. I was in my 30s before I knew anything about these matters which is particularly appalling because I am an academic. For much of my life I accepted uncritically the belief that gay people were gay as a result of the Fall.  Being gay is not what God wants for us and if someone is gay that person must live a celibate life.

Then, I met gay Christians and this led me to do two things. I learned more about sex and gender. And, I started to read works by Reformed theologians William Stacy Johnson, James Brownson and Jack Rogers. My understanding of how God created the body changed. My understanding of how to read Scripture changed. I now believe that LGBT people are made in the image of God just like everyone else.

This whole process for me took about twenty years. And, in the midst of it all I did not really know what to think about the issue of same-sex relationships of people who professed to follow Christ.  Because of Christian pluralism I have always believed that same-sex marriage should be legally recognized but I didn’t know what that meant in the church.  Should same-sex couples be allowed in the church?  Was that condoning sin? How should we think about Christians who were gay and in relationships?

During that period someone who has been a mentor to me said something that was powerful and I close with it here because I know that a lot of readers are in the same place that I was. This man said, “I do not know which approach is the right one. But, I do know that if I err, I choose to err on the side of loving and accepting those who follow Jesus no matter what their sexual identity.  When I stand before God I would rather defend myself having made a mistake by accepting gay Christians as full brothers and sisters at the table of God than defend myself having made a mistake by rejecting them.” 

That was persuasive to me.

 1. The U.S. organization that most closely represents this perspective on government is the Center for Public Justice in Washington D.C.  However, I do not speak for CPJ in any way.  I know that my perspective on the issue of homosexuality and same-sex marriage is different from theirs.

2. There is some disagreement among Christians in this pluralism perspective.  Some would say we can grant all the public, civil rights of marriage without actually calling it “marriage.”  To them marriage is a distinctively male/female institution. But, others say this is not full justice and elevates biology over the relationship aspect of marriage. They would say true justice occurs only when the legal term of marriage is offered to all. 

3. I anticipate that our next postings will relate to the rights of religious conservatives after Obergefell.  The story of Kim Davis, the county clerk who would not sign same sex marriage licenses is important, as is the litigation by Christian business owners who do not want to serve same-sex wedding clients.

Public Policy on Same-Sex Marriage: The State and the Church

Let me begin by stating the importance of this question for Christians as we begin to process the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling on same-sex marriage. While the reaction to this court decision among Christians ranged dramatically from elation to dismay to heartbreak, this case presents an opportunity for all Christians to reevaluate how to extend love to gays and lesbians in both the public sphere and within the Christian community. I firmly believe that how Christians respond to this moment will define the relevancy of Christianity to the broader culture in the years to come. This issue will also be a critical test for church unity and critical dialogue in the face of a deep theological and ideological divide. 

This essay outlines two basic public policy positions on same-sex marriage. First, in order for gays and lesbians to fully participate in public life as equal citizens, same-sex marriage should be upheld as a fundamental legal or civil right. This position advances the principles of democracy, in which every citizen in society is involved in defining the common good. However, religious institutions that oppose same-sex marriage should not be compelled to support this public law. Thus, public policy should grant exemptions from participating in same-sex marriage ceremonies to institutions that are inherently religious. This position is consistent with the concept of principled pluralism, which reflects the diversity and differentiation of God’s creation. This exemption also provides space for the church to pursue a healthy and honest discussion on this issue.

 

What Does Pluralism Require?

As the leading question acknowledges, we live in a pluralistic society. This term, pluralism, has undergone a radical transformation in Christian circles over the past three decades. In my view, the first treatment of this term among Christians was largely reactionary. The fading dominance of the Christian worldview in American society beginning in the 1970s caused anxiety among some quarters of Christianity.  These sentiments fueled the rise of the New Christian Right and the ushered in the culture wars in the politics of the 1980s and 1990s. 

However, I believe a more constructive connotation of pluralism has emerged over the last decade, one that seeks to respect individual differences within society and attempts to meet people where they are spiritually, intellectually, and relationally. For instance, in their recent book, Amazing Grace (2010), David Campbell and Robert Putnam find that those who regularly attend church increasing support civil liberties for opponents of religion and for homosexuals. These broad shifts have depoliticized Christianity and cultivated more political diversity within the Christian community. 

It is in this latter vein of pluralism that I start my policy discussion by first asking what does a pluralistic society that promotes individual freedom require of Christians as thoughtful and responsible citizens? A core value of liberal democracies is tolerance. Initially instituted to address religious diversity and the conflict it can inevitably breed, tolerance for other citizens is a necessary backdrop for a just political order that allows free people to play a role in public deliberation and decision-making (see Robert Paul Wolff’s essay “Beyond Tolerance” from 1965). This vision is also consistent with Steve Monsma’s definition of justice, which is by nature freedom-producing: “People are freed to develop their gifts, to follow their passions, and to live life to the fullest as the responsible, loving beings God created us to be” (Healing for a Broken World, 2008, p. 58). Thus, promoting the virtue of tolerance does not mean that God is absent from society in general or individual lives. It does mean that Christians give space for God to exercise his sovereignty.

An important feature of tolerance is the application of the law, which is an extension of the state. If we value the contributions and experiences of each citizen in civil society, then every citizen should have relatively equal standing under the law. American history is replete with examples of citizens being denied full citizenship because of a certain understanding of the law. Our history also includes instances in which the equal protection clause and the due process clause contained in the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution have been used to correct discriminatory or unfair treatment of the law. These actions have positively affected the lives of millions of racial minorities and women. The case of Obergefell and Hodges, which constitutionally struck down state bans on same-sex marriage, is the latest application of this principle. Granting same-sex couples the fundamental right to marry in the eyes of the state allow gays and lesbians to enter into public life as free individuals and enjoy all of the legal benefits that come with this civil designation. 

Lastly, pluralism prompts us to enter into a larger collective community and interact with people with different realities or belief systems than our own. For example, as a white male, I have a very limited point of reference for the everyday experiences of other racial and gender groups in society. However, citizenship requires that I consider these experiences in evaluating the overall effectiveness or value of public policy. To some degree, I am referring to the ideal of “e pluribus unum,” which calls Americans to unite under a single purpose. In order for this ideal to be realized in an authentic way, citizens must be committed to engaging in meaningful political conversations with different groups in society. This model of citizenship is increasingly difficult in an era of political and cultural polarization, but is nonetheless critical to defining the common good.   

These various requirements of a pluralistic society lead me to my first general policy position regarding same-sex marriage. For gays and lesbians to be full members of civil society, they should be entitled to the same rights and privileges as any other member of society. This, of course, means they should have the right to marry same-sex partners, but also not be subject to any forms of discrimination in areas of public life including voting, housing, education, and employment. This position is based on a pluralistic understanding of public policy that seeks to serve the common good, which must be informed by all members of society in order to be legitimate. I would also add that this position does not hinge on one’s personal view of homosexuality, but on the precepts of a civil society. 

 

The Role of Religion in Public Life

The position above obviously raises an important question on the role of religion in public life and the lives of individuals. How can Christians be salt and light in society (Matthew 5:13-16)? First of all, Christians can and should actively participate in political debates in order to promote a public agenda that advances justice, peace and reconciliation for all people. Within the public realm, this is how Christians can love our neighbors (Mark 12:30-31). Christians have the opportunity to be spokespersons for a common good that seeks to uplift every member of society, respects the God-given dignity of every human being, and builds meaningful communities based on mutual respect. These activities are connected to a cosmic view of redemption in which Jesus Christ seeks to reclaim all facets of creation.  

On the other hand, what constitutes the Christian life is communing with a living God. Christianity is also about sharing the transformative message of Jesus Christ. The question is can public policy transmit this very personal message? My own view is that it has severe limitations. Relationships to both God and others are much more important in serving this core mission. One of my favorite theologians is John Stott, who has succinctly linked the Christian walk to political involvement (see Decisive Issues Facing Christians Today, 1984). For example, praying, evangelizing, affirming Biblical truths, and being a faithful witness all touch the lives of individuals but can also have profound political consequences. More importantly, all of these elements of faith prompt to seek God first before pursuing our own and sometimes-flawed understanding of God’s will. 

Finally, churches and other voluntary organizations can act independently from the state to promote an alternative or more nuanced vision of what is advantageous for individuals and society at large. Some might refer to this arrangement as the separation of church, which has many different legal interpretations. A richer theological explanation for this arrangement is the concept of principled pluralism. Corwin Smidt provides an apt description of this Reformed concept:

Broadly speaking, principled pluralism may be viewed as a framework of understanding that serves to explain and accept the diversity evident in public life, that recognizes different structures of authority that operate within different spheres of social life, and that provides a basis for opposition both totalitarianism and individualism in political life.” (Church, State, and Public Justice, 2007, p. 127) 

Principled pluralism has two important implications for the public policy debate regarding same-sex marriage. First, according to this concept, organizations that are not tied to the state play a vital role in social life. Theologically, principled pluralism views God mediating his power on earth through various offices or representatives.  Thus, it suggests that religious and other types of organizations can rightly and with authority speak to the conditions of same-sex couples, family issues relating to same-sex couples, and the cultural impact of same-sex relationships. As such, these structures offer a unique space for Christians to discuss the moral, ethical, and theological dimensions of homosexuality.

Second, the concept of principled pluralism sees the world as a diverse and differentiated creation designed by God. As a result, no one structure should dominate the others as each serves a specific purpose. This notion suggests that non-state structures should have the ability to exercise some independence from the prescribed public policy, as long as these activities do not deprive citizens of basic legal protections. For religious structures, this independence has been pursued in religious free-exercise arguments pertaining to the First Amendment of the Constitution.  These arguments have been used to exempt individuals and organizations from complying with certain portions of the law that contradict a sincere religious conviction. 

The last point above is critically important to the Christian community as it seeks to understand this issue from a Biblical and theological perspective. In order for this discussion to be fair, thorough, and determinative, Christians who oppose same-sex marriage have to be allowed to speak their conscience. Openness and charity are needed as Christians come together to affirm the commitments of being a follower of Jesus Christ and to honestly explore how these commitments relate to same-sex relationships. Many of these discussions have already taken place; however, they must not stop because of the recent U.S. Supreme Court case recognizing same-sex marriage. We must continue to listen to each other and move forward on this issue together. 

The above discussion leads me to a second general public policy position. Religious organizations should be given a narrow religious exemption on the issue of same-sex marriage. Specifically, church clergy and religious institutions should be able to exercise their religious freedom found in the First Amendment and not be compelled to perform or take part in same-sex marriage ceremonies. This objection would be in line with past exemptions given to houses of worship, religious schools and missions in the selective employment of gays or lesbians. (See the Federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act).  Moreover, such exemptions do not deprive gays and lesbians from exercising the legal act of marriage through the state or other types of religious institutions that approve of same-sex marriage. 

Some have recently implied that the arguments for this type of a religious exemption are akin to arguments used to uphold racial segregation in the South in the 1960s (see William Saletan’s discussion in “The Race Analogy” in Slate). This argument suggests that opposition to same-sex marriage among Christians and other religious groups is motivated by enmity rather than a sincere desire to follow a specific religious doctrine. A full accounting of the values and behavior of most Christians would indicate this not to be the case. Moreover, this suggestion not only mischaracterizes the nature of the debate, it is toxic to any constructive debate on this issue publicly or within the church community.   

However, I want to be clear on when this religious exemption would not apply. First, it would not allow an individual acting on behalf of the state to refrain from the administration of same-sex marriage because of a personal religious belief to the contrary. Under this policy, Kim Davis, the Kentucky county clerk who refused to issue marriage licenses because of her objection to same-sex marriage, would not be able to exercise this religious exemption. Granting such an exemption in this case would cause too much harm to the legal rights of gays and lesbians. If this exemption were allowed, it would likely lead to a cascading effect across the country where more and more public officials would assert their own belief system rather than follow the law. The end result would be less and less freedom for gay and lesbian citizens.

According to the policy position above, this religious exemption would also not permit individuals in a private business setting to deny a variety of wedding services to gays and lesbians. Many of the high-profile stories on same-sex marriage pertain to this exact issue.  For example, earlier this summer the owners of a bakery in Oregon were fined $135,000 for denying service to a lesbian couple. The state of Indiana recently passed a controversial religious freedom restoration act that makes it legally possible for businesses to refuse wedding services to same-sex couples. The Hobby Lobby case or Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal statute on religious freedom applied to closely held corporations also raises arguments for this type of religious exemption. 

In my view, this exemption is not good public policy because it could easily be abused by individuals and businesses who may not have a sincere religious objection to same-sex marriage. It is much more apparent for religious organizations to demonstrate this objection because of their explicit religious mission, which would also encapsulate individuals with similar personal views. Moreover, the discriminatory nature of granting this type of religious exemption in largely the public sphere of commerce seems unnecessary and completely avoidable. 

 

Conclusion

As Christians begin to consider how to respond to the recognition of same-sex marriage, compassion and humility should guide our public policy approach. Christians have the opportunity to demonstrate compassion by ensuring that gays and lesbians can exercise fundamental legal rights that enable them to function in society and to flourish. The freedom that flows from these rights also allows individuals to develop into the people that God intended. Moreover, non-state structures can play a vital role in cultivating compassion for everyone touched by this issue.

Christians should also approach this issue with a healthy dose of humility. I am encouraged by the willingness of both sides of the debate on same-sex marriage to engage in a constructive dialogue within the church. We can only enter in such a discussion if we are open to God’s revelation, and practice humility in our own understanding of his Word and his general will. Christians can enter into this dialogue with full confidence of who God is and his continuous process of reconciliation for all things. 

Topic #5: Same-Sex Marriage: Pluralism (November 2015)

Conversation Partners:

  • Mikael Pelz, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Calvin College
  • Julia Stronks, Edward B. Lindaman Chair and Political Science Professor, Whitworth University
  • Adam MacLeod, Associate Professor of Law, Jones School of Law, Faulkner University

Leading Question: Given the pluralistic nature of American society, what stance should Christians take relative to public policy for or against same-sex marriage?